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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

April, 1942

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Volume XIX Number 2

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Published by
Crozer Theological Seminary
Chester, Pennsylvania

MORTON S. ENSLIN, Editor
RITTENHOUSE NEISSER, Business Manager

The policy of the CROZER QUARTERLY is to present investigations, discussions, and reviews in the field of religion which will prove of value and interest to the professional student of religion and to the layman.

Manuscripts, books for review, and communications for the editor should be addressed
Editor of the CROZER QUARTERLY
Chester, Pennsylvania
Business communications and subscriptions should be addressed
Business Manager of the CROZER QUARTERLY
Chester, Pennsylvania

Issued Quarterly $1.50 a year Single Numbers, 40 cents

Printed for the Crozer Theological Seminary by
THE JUDSON PRESS
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Entered as second-class matter, December 21, 1923, at the post office at Chester, Pa., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized December 21, 1923.

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PRINTED IN U.S.A.

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Vol. XIX APRIL, 1942 No. 2

THE PURITAN AND THE ANGLICAN SPIRIT

JAMES SHACKELFORD DAUERTY

First Presbyterian Church, Moorestown, New Jersey

THE PURPOSE, in this brief sketch of the contrast between the Puritan and the Anglican spirit, is that of an irenicon. There is probably no group or church, except of course the Roman, with which the liberal finds it so difficult to exercise his liberalism. I fear the attitude is rather widespread, which was expressed when I reviewed Richardson's *The Sacrament of Reunion* before our Presbyterian Ministers' Association a year and a half ago. One of the slender brethren quoted our Dr. Loetcher: "I can understand and respect the Unitarians; I can understand the position of the Romanists; but the Episcopalians are neither fish, flesh, nor fowl." Though a Pharisee of the Pharisees—of Covenanter stock back through Northern Ireland to Scottish Presbyterianism—I am quite as incapable of understanding *this* attitude as my former professor, the Anglican.

In a moment, I shall have done with the personal, but this appreciation of some things Anglican seems to be innate. My father was a Presbyterian minister, graduate of Princeton College and the Covenanter Seminary, Pittsburgh; every member of the family on both sides was Presbyterian. I was never in another church, until my senior year in preparatory school. But in my great-aunt's library was a prayer book, bound in deep blue cut velvet, which Captain James Madison Shackelford gave his first wife in Apalachacola, Florida, November 7, 1849. I discovered the book as a boy and shall never forget the thrill, the majesty, and the inclusive spiritual aspiration expressed with such beauty. I loved it as a lad in the grades, and that book today is one of my prized possessions. I am a Presbyterian, but, for the life of me, I cannot see why we should not recognize goodness and beauty—as well as truth—from whatever source it may come.

First, let us consider some of the distinguishing characteristics of the Puritans—if possible, the essence of the Puritan spirit.

In so brief a compass, it is impossible to trace the history of Puritanism, or to give a full evaluation. But we should remember that in its beginnings it was a controversy concerning the use of vestments and such ceremonial observances as kneeling while communicating and

making the sign of the cross in baptism. While this was the immediate cause, the origin is to be found in the desire for a more scriptural worship and in the resistance to sacerdotalism and ceremonial. This is of the essence of Puritanism.

Puritanism has been called the soul of Protestantism. As we are all well aware, the name was first applied as a nickname to a small number who wished to "purify" the church. It soon acquired respect because of the sterling qualities associated with it. Eventually it was accepted as the designation of a party in the nation, which numbered eminent divines, scholars, statesmen, and even poets in its ranks. It was one of the driving powers in the great struggle for constitutional freedom and for religious liberty. It became one of the most substantial and powerful forces in the national life.

While Queen Elizabeth broke with the papacy as completely as did her father, she was nonetheless averse to the views and purposes of the Puritans. She was no theologian, she despised disputation. She was an uncompromising disciplinarian and regarded the Church of England as her own church, over which she had supreme personal authority. Moreover, she cared for order, pomp, and appearance in religion no less than in other things.

Queen Elizabeth was the formative power in matters ecclesiastical. In the early part of her reign, the prominent bishops and churchmen were, for the most part, in close contact and in closer sympathy with the Swiss Reformers. Jewell may fairly be taken as a representative bishop during this period. He wrote his friend Bullinger at Zurich (1566): "I wish that *all,* even the slightest vestiges of popery might be removed from our church and above all from our minds. But the Queen is at this time unable to endure the least alteration in matters religious."

Differences between the queen and the Puritans came to a head in open conflict in the *Advertisements* of 1566, which "specified the minimum of ceremonial which would be tolerated in the church." Uniformity was to begin at a certain date; deposition from benefice to follow after three-month refusal of compliance. No explanation was permitted, and many who refused were sequestered and afterwards deprived and deposed. The deposition of so many ministers left several London churches unsupplied with ministers. Meanwhile they continued to conduct services with such congregations as gathered to them in secret, both in London and in the provinces. Many of the adherents were arrested and sent to prison, but in spite of all attempts at suppression the Puritan revolt grew in strength and determination. Under persecution it came to widen its opposition to vestments and the sign of the cross at baptism to opposition to the whole episcopal system.

With open conflict, Puritanism began to take entirely different directions and more radical positions. The main body of Puritans still remained conformist, still held Calvinistic opinions and used ceremonial only as compelled, still claimed to be faithful members and representatives of the church.

Besides those who were conformists, there were Puritans who were Presbyterian and those who were Independent. The Presbyterian sought to organize the church itself upon Genevan principles—and at one time came near doing it. The Independent or Separatist, while agreeing with the Presbyterian in opposition to episcopacy and in the desire to return to the primitive order of church government as he found it in the New Testament, still differed widely from him in other respects. The starting point in church polity for both Presbyterian and Independent was the existence of the spiritual life—the personal relation of the individual soul to God. The church for them was a community made up exclusively of such spiritual men.

The Presbyterians, while desiring to have the government of the church by presbytery—that is, by ministers and an equal number of elected ruling elders, as representatives in presbytery, synod, or general assembly instead of by diocesan bishops—and while desirous of substituting the Genevan Book of Discipline for the Book of Common Prayer, were in other respects in agreement with the main features of the episcopal system. That is to say, they favored a state church; and the church in a given parish ought, in their view, to embrace all the baptized persons of that parish whether they were spiritual people or not.

The Independents strenuously maintained that a Christian church should be composed exclusively of Christian men. The Millenary Petition, which the Puritans presented to King James VI of Scotland upon his accession to the throne of England may be taken as their constitution. In part it was:

1. *Concerning Church Service.* It prayed that the cross in baptism, the interrogation of infants, baptism by women, and confirmation should be done away; that the cap and surplice should not be enforced; that examination should precede communion; that the ring in marriage be dispensed with; that the Lord's Day be strictly observed; that church music should be moderated and the service abridged; that there should be no bowing at the name of Jesus; and that none but canonical scriptures be read.

2. *Concerning Ministers.* It prayed that none but able men, who could preach, be appointed; that non-residence be forbidden; and that the lawfulness of the marriage of the clergy be fully recognized.

3. *Concerning Church Livings.* It prayed that bishops be required

to abandon all preferment except their bishoprics, and that they be not allowed to hold additional livings *in commendam (i.e.,* "in trust").

This "constitution" reveals much that is right and salutary, especially regarding livings *in absentia,* incompetence in preaching, and the "interrogation of infants." But today Independents would regard the other petitions as insignificant, if not extreme. How shocked they would be on every count, if they could attend a service of their descendants in West Newton, Massachusetts, or at Riverside, New York City!

All of which is another way of saying that despite the heroic defence of liberty and non-conformity in Puritanism there is much that is purely *negative*: destructive and impoverishing, rather than constructive and enriching; much that is narrow, radical, bald, and bare.

If Puritanism was not broad and magnanimous in its beginnings, it certainly was concentrated and impulsive in its aims. While it may not elicit a hearty welcome from a free and easy humanity, its very narrowness and inward intensity was its chief strength. Whatever may be justly said in condemnation of the faults of Puritanism, the truth remains that "Puritanism has given a depth and passion not only to the religious life, but to the literature and patriotism of the country; it has contributed alike to its intellectual lustre and heroic frame."

For me, the best understanding of the Anglican spirit is through the lives and works of typical Anglicans. Certainly, it is no more fair to judge Anglicanism by its Bishop Mannings and petty priests than to judge Protestantism by its Barnhouses and Percy Crawfords. We are all so full of a number of things that it hardly behooves any of us forthrightly to condemn another; but when I think of that complex, the Anglican spirit, I think of such representatives as old John Donne, straight-thinking Richard Hooker, poetic George Herbert, and, as the quintessence of Anglicanism, tolerant yet devout and charming Jeremy Taylor. Any church which could give the world even four such men—and she has given countless others—deserves the gratitude and understanding of the world.

John Donne was descended from the same family as Sir Thomas Moore, born in London 1573. He was tutored at home until his tenth year. In his eleventh year he entered Oxford, having even at that time excellent command of French and Latin. At fourteen he was "translated" to Cambridge, that he might receive nourishment from both soils. He was a laborious student, but took no degree because, being a Romanist, he could not take the oath necessary to graduation. At seventeen he returned to London to study law. At nineteen he was studying divinity; then he travelled in Spain and Italy, and upon his return inclined toward

the Church of England. He fell desperately in love with the daughter of Sir George Moore. He married her secretly; consequently Sir George dismissed him from his service as secretary. Then followed years of hardship and ill-health. His relative, Sir Francis Wooley, opened his home to the Donnes, as Izaac Walton quaintly adds: "where they remained with much freedom to themselves and equal content to him, for some years; and as their charge increased—she was yearly with child—so did his love and bounty."

After being sent to France on an embassy, Donne reported to the king with such knowledge, that the latter urged him to enter the ministry. This he soon afterwards did. Of him Walton wrote: "The Church of England had gained a second S. Augustine; for I think none was so like him before his conversion, none so like S. Ambrose after it, and if his youth had the infirmities of the one, his age had the excellencies of the other, the learning and holiness of both."

Donne was thoroughly Anglican in his resentment against the fierce controversial style of his day. When asked regarding a certain book written on the Anglican side, he replied: "It is written *for* religion, *without* it." His own moderation and tolerance are evident:

> Beloved, there are some things in which all religions agree: the worship of God, the holiness of life. Therefore, if when I study the holiness of life and fast and pray and submit myself to discreet and medicinal mortifications for the subduing of the body, any man will say, "This is papistical! Papists do this!" it is a blessed protestation, and no man is the less a Protestant or the worse a Protestant for making it: "I am a Papist!" that is, I will fast and pray as much as any Papist and enable myself for the service of my God, as seriously, as sedulously and as laboriously as any Papist! So, if I startle and am affected at a blasphemous oath as at a wound upon my Saviour when I avoid the conversation of those men that profane the Lord's Day, any other will say: "This is puritanical. Puritans do this!" it is a blessed protestation, and no man is the less a Protestant nor the worse a Protestant for making it: Men and brethren, I am a Puritan! That is, I will endeavor to be pure as my Father in heaven is pure, as far as any Puritan.

Again, how Anglican when he speaks of worship: "Beloved, outward things apparel God; and since God was content to take a body, let us not leave Him naked or ragged."

In Donne I see the incarnation of the Anglican spirit.

Richard Hooker, a native of Exeter, was born about 1553, of humble but industrious parents. Even in childhood his modesty and aptitude for learning so impressed his teacher that he recommended him for an apprentice to continue him at school. This same teacher, on the completion of the lad's study at Exeter, interested a well-to-do uncle who induced John Jewell, bishop of Salisbury, to send him to Oxford. Walton bears ample evidence to his reverence, moderation, the deep respect of

his classmates, and his diligence in study throughout his life in the university. At nineteen he was admitted as one of the scholars of the Foundation. In 1577 he was admitted as a fellow of the college, thus being a contemporary of both Reynolds and Spencer, successive presidents of Corpus Christi College. He now enjoyed the friendship of Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer. His life was the expression of his words: "God abhors confusion as contrary to nature" and "Scripture was not writ to beget disputation and pride and opposition to government; but chastity and humility, moderation, obedience to authority, and peace to mankind."

Hooker was no ascetic mystic, as Walton suggests; his writings give evidence of a cheerful and happy disposition. He found pleasure in everyday enjoyments and appreciated human life in its many and varied aspects. He rejoiced in nature; he loved "to see God bring Spring upon his mother earth."

His work is the earliest in English prose with "enough of the preserving salt of excellence to appeal to modern palates." Solidity of learning, not ostentatiously displayed, but seen in the character and variety of his illustrations; a comprehensive mastery of all that relates to his subject, the breadth of his conceptions, ease and facility in the highest realms of thought; poetic sense and rare descriptions—all these compare favorably with the finest prose of Milton. His writing retains its freshness after the passing of three centuries. He takes his principles from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. His spirit is that of Greek thought. His philosophical thought was the starting point or foundation of Locke, though the latter reached conclusions quite other than those of Hooker.

While his "Polity" is a vindication of episcopal polity and customs, the fact significant for our thought is that he never demands the abolition of Presbyterianism from the place which it held in the Church of England. Rather, he remonstrates against the narrow ground chosen by the Presbyterians for their attack. He believed "a necessity of polity and regiment may be held in all churches, without holding any form to be necessary."

My purpose is not to make an exhaustive analysis of Hooker's polity, political philosophy, or of his place in literature, but simply to observe his life and attitude as expressive of the Anglican spirit.

And in Richard Hooker I see the incarnation of the Anglican spirit.

Next, let us glance at George Herbert. He was born April 3, 1593 in Montgomery Castle, of one of the noblest families of Wales. "The Herberts of Montgomery," says Walton, "were more noted for courage than for intellect. They were a race of soldiers, tall, handsome, black-

haired, who lived roughly, quarreled easily, were sensitive in matters of honor, and with a strong hand dealt out justice over their turbulent domains. The literary artistic tendencies seen in George were probably contributed by the mother, Magdalen Newport, granddaughter of Sir Thomas Bromley, Chief Justice under Henry VIII and an executor of the King's will. Even in that age prolific in powerful women, she was notable; for she combined beauty, pity, intellect, passion, artistic and literary tastes, business ability, and social charm."

In 1609 Herbert won a scholarship at Trinity College, Cambridge, and took his bachelor's degree three years later. In college he was quite the gentleman; he kept a riding horse, and apparently a small house at Newmarket, the racing town near Cambridge. In 1619 he became Orator of the University. Although his mother had always been desirous to have him enter the ministry, he kept procrastinating until her death in 1623. Her death affected him greatly. He resigned his oratorship and entered holy orders. Had Herbert died at this time, his name would never have been written in letters, state, or church. Into the next half-dozen years were packed all for which he is held in honor. In 1629 he suddenly married Jane Danvers, a relative of the Earl of Danby. She was a woman of beauty and independent means. The next year he was instituted at Bemerton. The rectory was out of repair, but he would not live at a distance, as his predecessor had done. He reconstructed it and immediately proceeded at his own expense to beautify the church. He gave himself with absolute devotion to writing and to the music and the services of the church. Both Herbert and Donne hesitated long before entering the ministry, but having decided, gave themselves with intense devotion, consecration, and piety. Herbert's life at Bemerton, as told by Izaac Walton is one of the exquisite pictures of literary biography. He held services twice daily. We are told: "Some left their plow to rest when Mr. Herbert's saints-bell rung to prayers, that they might also offer their devotions to God with his."

George Herbert was passionately fond of music. His own hymns were written to the accompaniment of his lute or viol. One of the fairest pictures in literature is Walton's portrayal of the gentle George Herbert walking to Salisbury for his semi-weekly visit to the cathedral, his profound delight in the cathedral choir, his finding on the way to the regular meeting of music lovers a poor man with his team stuck in the mud. Without hesitation he threw off his clerical coat and worked until they were free. Then he proceeded to his musical. His heart was as tender as Lincoln's.

Many maintain that Herbert's poems hold more of piety than poetry. But that competent critic, Professor *emeritus* George MacLean Harper,

of Princeton, has said some of them are among the finest in the language. I have reread with delight and profit *The Temple, The Church Porch, Sin, Virtue, The British Church, The Flower,* and *Sunday*—a benediction of which we know nothing in America today!

The *Encyclopædia Britannica*—and none will accuse it of undue enthusiasm—says of *The Temple:* "No poem in our language exhibits more of the spirit of Christianity. Every page is marked by a transparent sincerity and reflects the beautiful climate of the Holy Ghost." In three short years of ministry he wrote his name forever among the immortals. No wonder that, like the saints of old, he was buried beneath the altar of his church.

In George Herbert I see the incarnation of the Anglican spirit.

Finally, let us recall Jeremy Taylor. He was born in Cambridge, 1613. Archbishop Laud obtained a scholarship for him at All Souls' College, Oxford. He was ordained before he was twenty-one. He soon became Chaplain to the King. He took the side of the church and the king (Charles I), which cost him his living. He disappeared from sight; we find him teaching school at Newton. During this period of enforced retirement he did most of his writing: *The Life of Christ* and that exquisite manual of devotion for succeeding generations, *Holy Living.* His *Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying* is typical of the Anglican spirit. While a protege of Laud's he wrote this famous plea for toleration. His *Friendship* is also in character.

After three imprisonments he was appointed to a lectureship at Lisburn, Ireland, which he shared with a Presbyterian, as he humorously said, like Castor and Pollux—"one up and the other down." At the Restoration he might naturally have expected to return to England, but he remained in Ireland as Bishop of the See of Down and Conner with Dromore. As vice chancellor of the University of Dublin he immeasurably raised the standard of scholarship and administration. The burdens and difficulties of his bishopric in Ireland unquestionably shortened his life. He died of fever, which he contracted from a patient whom he had visited, when only fifty-five.

His wide, ready, capacious memory was a vast armory from which he could always draw the fittest weapon. His tenet was, "Theology is rather a divine life than a divine knowledge." His plea for toleration is based on the impossibility of erecting theology into a demonstrable science: "It is impossible that all should be of one mind. And what is impossible to be done, is not necessary that it should be done. Heresy is not an error of the understanding but of the will." But even for gracious Jeremy Taylor, toleration has a limit; this he defined as "whatever is against the foundation of faith, or contrary to the good life and

the laws of obedience, or destructive to human society and just interests of bodies politic."

Jeremy Taylor exemplifies fervor and zeal for the highest, with poise and control. He is a true Anglican.

While most of us spring from Puritan ancestry and while many of us profoundly revere our heritage, that is no reason for remaining within its limitations: an unnecessary narrowness and barrenness. The Puritan's purpose was intense. His very narrowness simplified his aim and aided his success. But he over-simplified life. There are many fields of the mind and of life, which he never recognized.

Inclusiveness is of the essence of Anglicanism. Does not the Anglican see more clearly into the map of the human soul? He knows that life, as nature, is not simple but complex. Exclusiveness is of the essence of Puritanism. Its tendency is to exclude or to separate from those who differ, even over minor issues.

Is it not possible to preserve the Puritan's passion for righteousness, "purity," and freedom, and at the same time appreciate—and incorporate—the spirit of Anglicanism at its best: a reasonable faith, wide intellectual sympathy, reverent and fervent piety, beauty and order, with art, architecture, music, all noble literature, and the humanities as handmaids of religion?

SPRINGTIME LEGENDS IN INDIA

W. NORMAN BROWN

University of Pennsylvania

THE HINDU poets have a distinctive conceit about nature burgeoning in the springtime. Great trees, like the ashoka, whose brilliant red flowers are the banner of conquering love, do not by mere volition or attribute of their being burst into bloom. Filled with a longing like that of a pregnant woman, the ashoka waits till some maiden chances to touch its trunk with her passing foot. Then the pregnancy longing is satisfied; in a kind of birth the buds suddenly expand into flowers, and the tree will in due time bear fruit. Says a poet:

> It was spring, when the kuruvaka trees bloom as the young maids embrace them, when the ashoka trees flower as the girls strike them with their feet, when the bakula trees blossom if gazelle-eyed maidens spray them with wine from their mouths, when the champaka trees break into flower if they are sprinkled with perfumed water.[1]

This quality of trees in the springtime season of love has more than a mere symbolic use by the makers of poetry. A lover seeking a maiden hidden from him in a grove may follow her path with its help:

> O fair Ashoka tree, with love's own red
> Thy boughs are all aflame;
> Whither, I pray thee, hath my wanton fled?
> This way I know she came.
>
> In vain thy nodding in the wind, thy sigh
> Of ignorance assumed;
> I know because my flower-love wandered by
> For joy thy branches bloomed.
>
> I know thee: ever with thy buds unblown,
> Till touched by maiden's foot;
> And thou so fair—one fairest maid alone
> Hath trod upon thy root.[2]

Sculpture and painting celebrate this theme in stone and color, and music has its springtime modes. The maiden clinging to the tree which leans over to receive her touch is one of India's oldest iconographic types. In music the Vasanta (springtime) mode comes to the singer, says an

[1] Bhāvadeva Sūri's *Pārśvanāthacaritra* 6.796-7.

[2] *Bhartṛhari,* translated by Paul Elmer More in his volume, *A Century of Indian Epigrams,* Houghton Mifflin Co.

Indian writer, "serene and subdued, like a sage sitting in a lonely forest or on a mountain, calmly contemplating the beauty of the universe."[3] Variantly, in painting, the mode is represented, says another Indian author (Mr. S. M. Tagore), "as a young man of golden hue, standing in a mango grove, dressed in yellow garments, and having his ears ornamented with mango blossoms, with others in his hands. His lotus eyes play around, and are colored like the rising sun. He is adored of the maidens."[4]

For in India, as in the West, spring is the season above all others for Kāma, the Indian Eros, to launch his arrows. Tipped with mango blossoms, these are too potent for even the gods to withstand, even that loftiest god of all, Shiva, whose special art it is to sink in the mystic contemplation induced by the practice of Yoga. It happened once that the universe was troubled by a noxious demon, and threatened with destruction, and the lesser gods were helpless before him. The only hope lay in the birth of a son to the great god Shiva, and Shiva unfortunately was so deeply lost in his meditation and so far from being in a procreative mood that he did not even see the lovely Pārvatī, daughter of the Himalaya, who was already performing austerities that she might win him as husband. But the gods called Kāma to aid, and he came with his wife Rati, "Passion," and his friend Vasanta, "Spring." When the three reached the high and frozen mountain where Shiva sat, Spring showed his power. The snow vanished; trees blossomed; birds, bees, and deer darted with new vigor. Only Shiva remained cold and unmoved. Then Kāma stood ready with his bow, and in a moment when Shiva relaxed the intensity of his concentration let fly his arrow. The great god saw him, and flashing fire from the third eye that is in the centre of his forehead, consumed him to ashes. But Kāma, being immortal, could not die; only his body perished—whence he is known in Sanskrit literature as The Bodiless. In the confusion Shiva disappeared, but so powerful had been the combination of Kāma and Vasanta, Love and Spring, that Shiva, though only having glimpsed the beauteous Pārvatī, was overcome against his will; and in the sequel he gave up meditation and took her as bride, whereby she became the mother of his son Kārttikeya, the war-god, who vanquished the troublesome demon and so saved the world.

Poets' fancies and mythmakers' creations often spring in India, as in Europe, from material belonging to the untutored folk, whose inherited traditions are of more interest to the anthropologist or student of religion than is the poet's finished song or the divine legend. The tree that can

[3] Popley, *Music of India*, p. 65.
[4] Popley, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

bring its pregnancy to a happy parturition only if some longing is gratified points back to an anthropomorphic conception of nature and natural objects. The tree itself has personality, or it may be inhabited by a divinity that has moods and responses like those of a human being. When the universe was oppressed by the demon, then Shiva, the great phallic god, lord of creatures, impregnated his mate, who is otherwise known as the Great Mother, the teeming Earth; this was the generation of the progeny that saved from destruction. Interpreted, the myth means that the earth, our mother, after a winter of unproductivity, is fertilized to new effort. The time is spring, when the warmth awakens the desire to create.

In parts of India Kāma, the god of love, has his own spring festival. This is often mentioned in the fiction literature; for then is the moment to bring together hero and heroine. That god who has for his banner the sea monster Makara, which is of old in India the emblem of the life-giving waters that fructify the earth, will see that the meeting results in love. Whole cycles of poetry are devoted to this festival, and often the manuscripts of the texts are illustrated with delicately executed paintings. A manuscript of a work called the *Vasanta Vilāsa,* "Sport of Spring," now belongs to the Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, where it is on exhibition. In those scenes lovers divert themselves in palaces or in groves, or pine in separation—"The mango is in bloom," says verse 33, "with a line of bees around it, which makes the separated lovers give vent to sighs that are like smoke from burning hearts." Gazelles play beside the human beings, and bees as large as the hero's hands seek honey from the fresh-opened flowers or the lips of the heroine. And in many of the paintings there sports the god Kāma, far from bodiless here, in spite of Shiva's consuming glance, carrying his bow made of flowers with its bowstring of bees, himself a vigorous young man in the first fine rapture of youth—his chin adorned with a thick and well-pointed beard!

From my boyhood days in India I remember best of all the yearly festivals that which is called Holi, a coming in of the spring. At the time of Holi groups of men stand in the roadway with tubs of red-colored water and squirt-guns, with which to spray all passers-by, except the ununderstanding Europeans. It was a festival that appealed to my small boy's heart, and I watched the colored-water play with envy; for I was forbidden to take any part in it. Others besides my parents viewed the festival with misgiving. The solemn Brahman pandit who came every day to read Sanskrit with my father regarded it with only a doubting tolerance. Not for him the red liquid; and on the days of Holi he would stay at home lest the irreverent crowds spray him, even though he might

forbid them; for with the celebrants on those days all rules were off. Brahman may be victimized as readily as coolie, and his curse is harmless.

Since my boyhood I have learned more about that festival, and I know that it is a spring fertility rite of the peasants, which seems to have arisen among the non-Aryan people of India, perhaps before ever the Aryans came into the land some fifteen hundred years B.C. The sun has now turned on its northward path, and the warmth has arrived after the winter chill. The reddened water is variously interpreted as merely auspicious, or as emblematic of the spring colors, or as a symbol of the Earth Mother's menstrual flow.

The most important feature of the Holi festival is not the throwing of the colored water, which was the only part that impressed me in my childhood. The essence is the lighting of a bonfire, which may burn for several days, but in every case must burn on the night of the full moon. Various legends are told to explain the fire, one of which refers to that burning glance with which the god Shiva consumed Kāma. When that happened, the demons with their leader thought that Kāma had failed to move the mighty lord to love and the gods would never get his son as their saviour, and they burst into taunts and derisive laughter—and this, it is sometimes said, is the original of the custom at Holi of using obscene language, with the result that decent women keep off the streets. Doubtless we should see in the fire the burning of the old year, and the making ready for the new, which comes just after Holi, or perhaps it is a bit of magic to help the mounting sun at the equinoctial turn. The obscene language and indecent acts, in the same manner as hornblowing and other loud noises, will keep away the evil spirits that might retard fertility in crops, animals, or mankind.

In some places this agricultural festival has attracted to itself features belonging to the cult of the god Krishna, the god who is the speaker of the great inspirational work, the mystic Song of the Lord, called the *Bhagavad Gītā*. For Krishna has another aspect, in which he is India's bucolic or dairy god, and his story is basically a fertility myth. In a forest on the banks of the river Jumna, between the two cities of Agra and Mathura, he tended the flocks and sported with the cowherds and milkmaids, especially the milkmaids. Irresistible, he enticed them from their husbands to follow him into the forest, where they danced with him, while he by his divine power multiplied himself, or seemed to, until each had a separate Krishna with whom to unite. The tale as viewed today among the upper intellectual levels of Hinduism is an allegory of the human soul that breaks its attachment to the world and finds bliss in union with god; but in the Holi festival it is the primary, not the symbolic, meaning of the love episodes that is in the folk mind, and this

gives an occasion for the prophylactic obscenity that wards off demons and assists fertility.

Holi is a celebration of the lower castes, but high-caste folk, if they will, may profit from it on the day after the full moon, by touching a low-caste person—and then immediately taking a ceremonial bath—and so warding off disease. So much of the low-caste man's virtue may accrue to the upper. After Holi everything starts afresh; for, as one legend has it, on the following day the god Brahma created the world.

The festivals of Kāma and of Holi illustrate the more obvious symbolism of spring in India, perhaps the deepest rooted, the least self-conscious and intellectual. There are others of more mystic interpretation. Speculative Hindus, back in the late Vedic age *(ca.* 1000 B.C.), had acquired a notion of the year and its seasons as the All, and having learned some astronomy they considered the year as dependent upon the sun. The sun was to them a Mighty Person, a universal conqueror and ruler. With three vast embracing strides it mounts upward, with one passing the earth, with one the atmosphere, and with one the sky, to reach the highest point of heaven. Throughout the year it performs this feat daily. And the rhythm of alteration in the changes of the sun's position in relation to the earth, as it swings from south to north and back again, constitutes the year with its seasons and months, its days and nights—the great wheel with twelve spokes and 720 parts.

But, though a conqueror, the sun cannot continue this recurring cycle merely through his own strength. In the *Rig Veda,* India's earliest book, his inner sufficiency is hardly doubted. But in the following stratum of thought he is in need of periodic refreshment. This he gets from the sacrifice, which is now no longer a mere propitiatory offering to all-powerful gods, but a spell with a virtue superior to the power even of those very gods. Rightly performed, the sacrifice automatically accomplishes its end, without reference to the volition of the gods, and, if it is not performed, the gods will not be able to complete their function of renewed creation. So with the sun. A daily offering was made to him and for him in the household ceremonies, and larger public sacrifices work to his benefit, including, it is thought, the greatest of all ancient Hindu ceremonials, the Horse Sacrifice. The horse is interpreted to symbolize the sun, and the object of the sacrifice is fertility. The king who would celebrate it started at about the beginning of what in India is called "Early Spring." Only the greatest king could accomplish the entire ceremony and thereby show himself a Mighty Person, to win the sun's epithet of Wheel-Turner. He must be a king who had established himself on his throne, subdued all his rivals, and won a position as

universal monarch, mounting to the zenith of earthly rule as the all-conquering sun rises to the top of heaven.

The sacrificial victim is a swift horse, black in front, white behind, with a dark mark. On the initial day of the yearlong rite the king, his four wives, and their four hundred maidens of various ranks, assemble to watch the consecration of the animal, which is first put through a ceremony addressed to Varuṇa, god of the waters, perhaps the cosmic waters that produced the universe. After this it is let loose to wander at will for a full year; no control is to be exercised over it except to see that it does not bathe and does not have intercourse with mares but conserves its sexual strength for the final fructifying purpose. During the year it is guarded by four hundred armed youths, who go wherever it goes, and keep it from harm. If it enters another king's territory, and he suffers it willingly, he thereby acknowledges his submission. If he resists, the youths accompanying the horse with the imperial army must conquer that king. When at length the horse returns with its triumphant guard, a long ceremony takes place, in which the queen anoints it and places 101 gold pieces in its tail. At this point in the ritual the priests engage in a curious exchange of cosmic riddles, such as, "Who, verily, moveth quite alone; who, verily, is born again and again; what, forsooth, is the remedy for cold; and what is the greatest pile?" The answer is, "The sun moveth quite alone; the moon is born again and again; Agni (god of the fire) is the remedy for cold; the earth is the great (= greatest) pile." The citation of the sun in this illustrative riddle is not unique; many riddles are enshrined in Vedic texts, and one long hymn of the *Rig Veda* (1.164) contains in its fifty-two stanzas almost an equal number of such puzzles, most of which refer to the sun.

After many other animals are slain in the sacrifice, the horse itself is covered with a garment and killed by smothering. Then the chief queen goes underneath the garment and unites with it, while the priest and the maidens and other queens give themselves to ribald dialogue. The horse is now cut up, various other rites are observed, and the priests exact their fees, which if the books are to be believed were staggering, sometimes including the queens themselves.

The mythic content of the ceremony seems to be that the horse is an emblem of the sun, as still today in many other connections in India. It is sacrificed for fertility, that it may impregnate the earth, here represented by the chief queen. If successfully performed, the sacrifice will insure undisturbed prosperity to the king, who like the sun is a Mighty Person and Wheel-Turner, a universal monarch, and to the earth, which is his kingdom, will guarantee unfailing fertility.

Hindu legend has a long list of kings who celebrated this sacrifice; and one of the ghats, or flights of steps leading to the water front, at Benares is called the Ghat of the Ten Horse Sacrifices, after events believed to have taken place on that spot. Documented history is less generous to the ancient rulers, and attests the rite for very few. So rare was it in sober fact that when a monarch did succeed in completing it, he might strike special gold coins in commemoration. And history does not record at all whether famine, pestilence, war, and want then ceased during his reign, and left the sea-girdled earth, happy under the single parasol of his rule, to enjoy his protection in unmarred prosperity and fecundity.

The generative force of the sun has other springtime manifestations in India's mythology besides the symbolism of the horse sacrifice, of which some, unlike that ceremony, are still effective. In the two great religions of Buddhism and Jainism the founders of the faith, the Buddha and Mahāvīra, have many qualities, epithets, and details of legend that come from the older sphere of sun adoration, and the two are known to their respective followers as being from birth Mighty Persons. Each of them, like the sun, is born to start his career in the spring. Each is a conqueror and Wheel-Turner. How much should I repeat from the golden legends of those two teachers, who won the victory over the misery that is life?

When the young prince, the future Buddha, was born, amazing circumstances accompanied the event. Not the least was the appearance to an aged mystic of a band of heavenly beings, like the angels to the shepherds in the Christian story, who announced that the future Saviour of mankind was born, to set rolling the Wheel of the Law in the forest of saints. The ascetic left his solitude to visit the royal household and there he saw the babe, "glowing like flame, pure as the moon traversing the sky, or like the brilliant autumn sun unobstructed by clouds." When he took the child in his arms, he saw that it had the thirty-two marks on its body that indicate a Mighty Person—wheels on the soles of his feet, a golden color, and many other more or less surprising characteristics, such as the possession of forty teeth. Like the Jewish Simeon when he saw the infant Jesus, the Indian saint prophesied the child's glorious mission as a Wheel-Turner, and also like Simeon grieved that he himself would not live to see this glory accomplished. The child's father knew full well the double potentiality of a Wheel-Turner: he knew his son might become either a universal temporal monarch or a universal religious saviour. Unhesitatingly he elected world emperorship for the child, and tried, but unsuccessfully, to keep from him any sight that might arouse a

spiritual interest. The story is well known—the four exempla that the young prince saw, the silent departure one night from the palace to undertake the quest for salvation, the many years of wandering, of resort to teachers who did not satisfy him, of asceticism, the final seat under the Wisdom Tree, whence he could not be driven by the Evil One, and the victory and enlightenment he won there. When he preached his first sermon, in the deer park at Sarnath outside of Benares, he at last fulfilled the prophecy and became a Wheel-Turner. As a sun of the spirit he made the Law revolve, and his first sermon is called the Sermon of the Turning of the Wheel of the Law. He had reached the highest spiritual place; he had become the mighty spiritual conqueror.

In most of the Buddhist world his birth is celebrated by a festival, which reëchoes each year the hope his life and teaching give his followers. The Buddha's birthday is the full-moon day of a lunar month (Vaiśākhā) that comes in our April and May. Several years ago (1935) I was in Ceylon at about that time. All the Buddhist shrines were gay; the people wore new and bright clothes; the newspapers were publishing special numbers with religious articles, poems, paintings. It was a time of joy, though hardly of relief after a cold winter, for in Colombo it rarely gets below 90° at any season of the year. But for them it was spring. It was more than spring; it was jointly the anniversary of their Saviour's birth and the renewal of nature's productivity. It was the Christian Christmas and Easter in one.

Jainism is the other great heretical faith in India and opponent of Brahmanical Hinduism, which is orthodox. Like Buddhism it arose in the fifth century B.C., but it is slightly the elder; the Buddha was a younger contemporary of Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism. Mahāvīra is not his given name but an epithet meaning "Great Hero," just as the appellation Buddha is an epithet meaning "The Enlightened" and Christ an epithet meaning "The Anointed."

Strange are the stories of Mahāvīra's conception. When his soul, which was living in one of the Jain heavens, realized that the time had come to be reborn on earth as a world Saviour, it first descended into the womb of a Brahman woman. That was a mistake, as Shakra, chief of the gods, saw; for according to Jain dogma, a Saviour could not be born among Brahmans, but only in a princely family. The god sent the leader of his army, who is also a deity of fertility, to transfer the embryo from the Brahman woman to the city's queen, and on that night the queen had fourteen wonderful dreams (another legend says sixteen). Soothsayers the next day interpreted these as a sure indication that the child who had just been conceived was a Mighty Person and would be a Wheel-Turner. The birth took place in the spring on the fourteenth day

of the Indian month Chaitra, which comes in our March and April. From the time when the future Saviour came into the family, all the royal possessions began to increase, all the gold, silver, corn, seraglio, arms, subjects, family glory. In consequence his parents decided to call him Vardhamāna, a Sanskrit word meaning "the one who experiences increase," and this was his real name. His parents, like the Buddha's, hoped that their son as a Wheel-Turner would be a universal monarch rather than a universal spiritual Saviour; and it was not until after they had died that he began his course of asceticism and search for the highest knowledge. It took him more than twelve years to reach his goal, after an uninterrupted sequence of the most severe self-mortification; but on the tenth day of the month Vaiśākhā (April-May), again in the spring season, he obtained omniscience and entered upon his mission as a Tīrthankara, that is, Maker of a Ford across the ocean of rebirth and misery. For his conquest over ignorance and the world he was called Mahāvīra, "Great Hero," the name by which we know him, also Jina, "Victor," from which comes the appellation of the faith as Jaina, "religion of the Victor," which we adapt and Anglicize as Jainism. He, too, like the sun was become a conqueror, born in spring, omniscient in spring, a bringer of prosperity, spreader of the light that is truth, the Mighty Person turning the Wheel of Religion, the Saviour.

When we think of the springtime hope which the anniversaries of the Buddha's and Mahāvīra's births have for nearly 2,500 years brought to great numbers of people, we may well ask what it was in their teaching that moved men's hearts. Something tangible it must have been and something new, when they first began to preach, and it must have had a high validity, for it still touches the imagination. Yet it could not have been entirely new; for then it would have been only novel and strange and have got no enduring hold. Those teachers built upon two old Indian ideas which they accepted as axioms: first, that every being is living in a beginningless and endless series of existences, always unhappy or unsatisfactory, one succeeding another immediately on the occurrence of what we call death; second, that each separate birth is conditioned by the retributive effect of that creature's emotionally motivated deeds in previous existences. But the Buddha and Mahāvīra differed from orthodox Brahmanical Hinduism in the answer they give as to the way of escaping from the otherwise inescapable round of rebirth. Escape comes, they said, not from performing ceremonial acts and so satisfying the ritual of the sacrifice, nor from observing the regulations and strictures of caste. Salvation was to be won by knowledge, and here they agreed with one aspect of the solution to the problem offered by Brahmanism; for it too said that knowledge was effective. But they passed beyond

Brahmanism in laying down as the first principle of social conduct for one who would win that saving knowledge a strict observance of an ethic which on the practical side of religion is the most striking feature of their doctrine. This was the initial step on the road to salvation. It was not in itself one that would carry to the end, for much more was needed; but it was one that anyone, however lowly of intellect, could hope to use and so better himself in successive rebirths, with the vague hope that at some time in a distant future existence he might reach such a state of spiritual grace that he could profit fully from hearing the Truth preached and enter upon the final struggle for release and eternal bliss.

The essence of the social teaching, the ethic, which those two great teachers promoted, was the doctrine of ahiṁsā. This is the principle of doing no injury to any living creature. It is a hard word to translate; Gandhi after much thought renders it by the negative term "non-violence," and admits that the translation is not adequate. For ahiṁsā also has a positive side: it is loving-kindness, self-sacrifice, if need be the laying down of one's life for another. The idea was hardly original with either the Buddha or Mahāvīra; but it was they who emphasized and popularized it, so that it won a place of supreme importance in India's estimation. Today it is that country's primary ethical principle; Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu alike use the common Sanskrit phraseology *ahiṁsā paramo dharmaḥ,* "Ahiṁsā is the highest religion." It is the chief of the five vows the Jain monk takes; it is the profession of the Buddhist mendicant; it is an axiom with the Hindu searcher for God; it is the unquestioned ideal of the laymen of all faiths.

The notion of loving-kindness is known to many religions, but in the form of ahiṁsā the religions of India give it its most extensive application. "Who," we might ask of any faith, "is my brother, to whom I should extend this loving-kindness?" Christianity gives the answer in the parable of the Good Samaritan; man's brother is his fellow man. The religions of India go farther and include all animal creation; Jainism even includes certain forms of plant life.

The very footsteps of the teachers who have spread the doctrine of ahiṁsā are still today honored with perfect devotion. Though the teaching of loving-kindness is one which is often lamentably violated in practice even in India, it still grips the national mind there as nowhere else. This notion it is which makes the Buddhist and the Jain, and the Hindu as well, honor the memory of their teachers.

In a world where non-injury has passed from men's hearts in the hate that is the soul of war the Indian ever hopes for a better day. Each spring he trusts for a more enlightened world. On one level India may

joy in the new flowering of nature; on another she may seek a spiritual rebirth. The late Rabindranath Tagore, in one of his Bengali poems which he himself translated into English and published in 1935 in the Buddha birthday number of Ceylon's leading newspaper, expressed the thought in words.

TO THE BUDDHA

The world to-day is wild with the delirium of hatred,
the conflicts are cruel and unceasing,
crooked are its paths, tangled its meshes of greed.
All creatures are crying in anguish for a manifestation of thine.
Oh Thou of boundless life, save them, raise thine eternal voice of hope,
Let love's lotus with its inexhaustible treasure of honey
Open its petals in thy light,
O Serene, O Free, in thine immeasurable mercy and goodness
Wipe away all dark stains from the heart of this earth.

Thou giver of immortal gifts, give us the power of dedication,
claim from us our greed,
and pride of self.

In the splendour of a new sun-rise of wisdom
let the blind gain their sight, let life come to the souls that
are dead.
O Serene, O Free, in thine immeasurable mercy and goodness
Wipe away all dark stains from the heart of this earth.

The message of India's teachers, as of the Occident's, is the ever renewed vision of an order free from contention and hate. This men may see as the goal beyond the wars which they must fight before they can reach it. Spring is the time for their courage to be reborn.

ANOTHER ESSAY ON CIRCLES

W. R. McNUTT

Crozer Theological Seminary

EMERSON'S famous essay on "Circles" is still timely and worth recalling. His thesis is that around every conceivable circle another and a greater may be drawn. Thus are all human achievement and all human progress symbolized.

Let me speak under the symbolism of circles, two in number. One of these is greater than the other, but does not lie round about the lesser; rather are they side by side, and at a certain point contiguous. They rest upon a common base line immediately before our eyes, the lesser on our left, the greater on our right. At the point where their circumferences touch I would construct a narrow bridge designed to bear a considerable amount of traffic between the two, for people live in either the one or the other.

Above the circle to our left, the lesser of the two, I am writing, "The prescientific universe," and over the larger, "The scientific universe." From the days of Francis Bacon until now there has been an ever-emerging flow of traffic from left to right across this bridge, not infrequently to the point of congestion and difficult traffic snarls. Over this considerable period of time the movement has been so uniformly in one direction that the smaller circle has been vacated of practically all informed human beings and of all major human interests. It is into this larger universe that all of us of this generation have been born, and in it reared. Into its mysteries our children are inducted from infancy, and concerning its intricacies they have been educated throughout their days in school and college. So it has come to pass that all of us truly "live and move and have our being" within the universe symbolized by the larger circle.

I repeat that there are few who continue to dwell within the prescientific; and I do not mean to be unkind when I refer to them as the benighted. They make up the roll of the fortune tellers, the astrologers, the soothsayers, the medicine men, the witch doctors, the exorcisers of demons, and their like. With every passing year their numbers grow less as the spread of education widens, for all modern education moves within the larger circle. The little worlds of hocus-pocus in which these diminishing groups of human beings operate have shrunk to the vanishing point as whatever modicum of truth or value each held has been transported across the bridge into the larger circle. For instance, the astrologer has become the astronomer, others are superceded by medical men, and

yet others by psychologist and psychiatrist. Verily our smaller and more ancient circle is like a deserted city whose buildings decay and whose streets return to the jungle.

But for us here is the tragedy, stark and unbelievable, namely, that the only major human interest yet largely resident within the prescientific circle is religion, and particularly institutionalized Christianity. Our historic faith was born in the prescientific universe, of course, and within that universe it grew its patterns of thought and built its outward structure. This is true not only of the Catholic type of Christianity but of the Protestant also, though in somewhat lesser degree. Though multiplied millions of the adherents who compose these great bodies of Christians live and work within the larger circle six days in the week, on the seventh they journey across a tottering bridge into the prescientific for religious worship and soul-nurture because, forsooth, the so-called leaders and guardians of the church seem resolved to keep the institution alive in a universe which has already passed away.

But regardless of this desire on the part of the entrenched forces of a conservatism that will not move, that will not suffer change, that stubbornly refuses enlightenment, the transition must be made, unless, of course, we are willing to invite utter ruin. This threat is already imminent and ominous. Increasingly the churches are losing the educated, since they are children of a scientific era. These must have a religion which meets their present needs in the present world in which they live. The young people who are growing up, native to the larger circle, are forsaking the churches whose prescientific language they cannot understand and whose thought patterns are vague, unreal, and unrelated to life as they find it. One, two, or three generations, out of inherited loyalties, may continue a nominal interest in "the religion of father and mother," and may continue this journey back and forth between the circle in which they live and the circle in which their religion exists, but that process is nearing the end. Anyone acquainted with the facts of contemporary Christianity knows that it is sick unto death in wide areas wherein religion is unreal, empty, unrelated to actual life here and now, and hence totally unable to help people meet the issues of life in the day of their great need.

At the present juncture religious leaders should see clearly, and resolutely choose the path they propose to follow. Before them lie three possibilities: 1. they may determine to live safely and securely and wholly in the prescientific circle, devise various coercions, and become the opiate of the people, or 2. they may attempt to live astride the bridge with one foot, so to speak, in either circle, or 3. they may make a clear and decisive break with circle number one and set out to transport into circle

number two all of Christianity which is able to live vitally and function realistically in the climate which belongs to the scientific universe. The old Russian Orthodox Church elected the first named way; it paid the penalty which that policy, in the long run, must ever pay. So-called fundamentalism has preëmpted the second way; for six days in each week it lives in the greater circle but on the seventh crosses over into the smaller to cultivate religious interests. It is thereby creating inner tensions which issue in lack of religious health, in compensating emotionalism, in vicious unrealities, and in ultimate defeat of its undertaking. The third way is left to religious liberalism, in which alone is there any hope for a vital Christianity able to save the people who live in our contemporary world. I refer to that liberalism which has a great faith in God, which sees the hope of the world to lie in Jesus Christ and his own good news, and which longs to see the churches of Christendom qualify as the divine channel for world redemption. That liberalism is charged with the superlative task of saving Christianity from prescientific concepts and accumulations, in order that it in turn may save an age that has no living interest in the prescientific. Not long since a conservative theologian speaking in Philadelphia indicated that there existed the everpresent task of removing the barnacles which Christianity, like a great ship, had accumulated by sailing the seas, as it were, for many centuries. With that illustration we may agree, providing *all the barnacles* be removed, and not merely the inconsequential portion suggested by him. A number of his so-called "fundamentals" were none other than prescientific, smaller-circle barnacles!

When the liberal faces the task of rethinking his religion in terms of our larger circle, he is met by those who say that he cannot transport a part without transporting all, since to separate is to destroy. That position is just as false as to contend that to remove barnacles is to destroy the ship. On the contrary it becomes a necessary task. There are those who cry aloud saying that the liberal has nothing vital to transport from the prescientific into the scientific circle, that he leaves behind the fundamental portions. If true, that is a very serious and ominous charge. Let that charge be examined; what does the liberal propose to bring over as qualified to live in the present? (Incidentally what he cannot transport may be left behind to perish with the prescientific which produced it.)

In the sense in which the term is here employed I count myself a liberal. I live within this present universe symbolized by the greater circle. From the prescientific I long have been transporting those verities that seem to me to have validity in the present and which are, at the same time, the essentials for my own Christian thought and life. In this process I

am guided by the same basic assumption made by the world of science, namely, that there are no exceptions in the universe. Absolute dependability is the law of its existence; exceptional occurrences and exceptional people there are, but no one of these is *an exception.*

Maintaining intellectual and moral honesty I am able to transport into our larger, scientific circle, these essential and abiding convictions: God, man the child of God, the fact of sin, Christ as Son of God, salvation in Christ, resurrection and immortality, the Bible an inspired and sufficient guide for the seeker, the integrity of the human personality, and not a few corollaries of these basic convictions.

God is the same yesterday, today, and forever; but men's thoughts concerning him are ever changing. When God is brought over into the larger circle by the liberal, he must be re-thought and made to fill the boundless universe whose creator and sustainer he is. In this universal order revealed to us by the age of science God is at once imminent and transcendent; just as the inventor of a complicated piece of machinery is at the same time in his invention and above it, so also is the Eternal God. The superlative demand of this universe is for infinite Mind at creative, purposive work; hence I conceive God to be infinite Person.

Man is the child of God whose mental, moral, and spiritual image he bears in very great potentiality. These rich endowments are surety that he may rise to glorious heights, or, alas, fall to pitiable depths; in the one case honoring his Father, in the other bringing him pain and disgrace.

Sin is an everpresent and stubborn fact in the universe, a fact with which men have to do. In truth it is of men and not a thing apart. It arises within the area wherein morally free man makes his choices, and essentially it results from either inability or disinclination to make sound moral choice. Men habitually form themselves into social groupings and, as groups, may make wise or unwise choices involving right and wrong. In the latter case social sin, as against individual sin, results.

Jesus Christ, in an unique and striking sense, is the Son of God and also the son of David. He was and is the God-Man, one in whom was resident (or incarnate) a striking fullness of God. Both his divinity and his humanity (as the churches have ever taught) stand secure. In him God is well pleased, and in him men ought to see that perfected humanity which the Father designs for all and sets before all as the goal and challenge for both individual and society. This Christ is the Way, and as such he is himself the living message of the churches for our time.

Salvation for man is in Christ; that I hold to be the glad and joyous fact. Essentially that salvation comes as a process wherein a sinner so relates himself to his Saviour that he too is enabled to make

right moral choices and to triumph over sin. Thus he comes off victor by and through him whom he has crowned Lord of his own life. Essentially salvation is ethical triumph.

Resurrection and immortality hang together; the one is antecedent to and a symbol of the other. The latter is the significant matter for faith therefore, and as a fact we may affirm it with both intellectual integrity and great joy. Indeed immortality is "the great hope" of mankind, and it is vindicated to all by our Lord who is called "the first fruits of them that slept," *i.e.,* in him immortality was made plain or "brought to light." Therefore, held his disciples, conviction overcame doubt. Hence our faith is that some, in proportion as Christ has lived again in them, will live beyond in joy, while others will know sorrow and remorse.

The Bible is composed of inspired writings and, rightly understood, contains the *word of God* and *the word of man.* The word of God may be conceived as some sort of revelation, the word of man as discovery—two strands which are woven like warp and woof into a tapestry of beautiful pattern. As the Bible stands, it is a "sufficient guide" for the devout seeker after God and the abundant way of life. Even so that seeker should not be above the enlightening task of sitting at the feet of those more skilled than he in disentangling and evaluating the two component strands. Great damage is wrought by two enemies of the Scriptures, namely, those who say, "This is the word of God only," and those who hold, "This is the word of man only." Both alike err and thereby do violence to the Bible on the one hand and to sound religion on the other. The Bible is both, I repeat, the word of God—a mischievous phrase as popularly used—and the word of man; to expect to find a proper balance between these two is to maintain a healthy view of our sacred literature.

As child of God the human person is endowed with integrity as his own right. He can think and thereby arrive at truth; he can make moral judgments and discern the good; he can apprehend beauty, and order his life thereby. He moves through the earth as a king (though often he barters his crown), and in his person he crowns the whole creative process of the Eternal.

In all fairness it must be affirmed that the man who has been compelled to move his residence from the smaller to the greater circle has not thereby left behind all the values of his religion. In fact he has transported a *very great and vital faith,* leaving in the attic of his former home only a few, valueless odds and ends which have no meaning in the universe as scientifically conceived, the universe which henceforth he is to call his home.

In conclusion let it be observed that an analysis of the strife which

afflicts contemporary American Christianity will reveal the cause to be a tension between two world views, between the two circles. The forces that clash are those who are resolved to continue our holy faith within the prescientific, and those who, seeing no future for a faith cast in the prescientific, are determined to re-think their faith in terms of their own world. To them, religion must always be realistic and contemporary, otherwise it is vague, unreal, and useless. This is the nub of all our controversy, and so far as I can see there is no possible compromise. Either Christianity will come to be at home within this universe as conceived by contemporary men or it will perish with the decadent prescientific. The battle lines are drawn; the liberals must win else all shall lose and all spiritual treasure be lost. Not even God can save men, willfully blind, nor their religion, however dear, from the oblivion which they invite by resolving to dwell in a world that no longer exists.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE WILL OF GOD

THOMAS SAUNDERS

Holland, Manitoba

THE TITLE originally allotted to this article was not the one which appears above, not even a reasonable facsimile of it, although it bore a remarkable likeness. It was "The Church and the Will of God." Superficially the two titles bear a strange similarity; actually they are as different, if not as night from day, at least as dusk from dawn. The reason for the change in title will appear, I trust, as we proceed.

In Jesus' life as we know it, the will of God was the determinative factor for all action. From the beginning to the end of his ministry we find this to be true. All four evangelists, regardless of the particular Christology which permeates their works, are united in this one thing. The motive force behind Jesus' teaching, his miracles, his acceptance of the cross itself, was the doing and the revealing of God's will to men. This was the aim and ruling passion of his life.

To say this, of course, does not tell us what God's will is, but it gives us a clue that may be used to that end. It gives us, in fact, a double clue. It gives us first, a clue as to the *nature* of God as revealed in the personality and teaching of Jesus, and second, a clue as to the nature of God's *will,* as derived from the same source.

It is a fact that must be self-evident that God's *will* and God's *nature* go hand in hand. If God's nature be of one condition, then his will, it follows, must be of a similar condition. Thus, it is of primary importance in this discussion that God's nature, as revealed in and through Jesus, is that of a heavenly Father. The ethic of Jesus was not just the doing of God's will—it was the doing of the will of a particular kind of God; and the particular kind of God in whom he believed and to whom he held his whole being in fee was a God to whom he looked as to his Father in heaven. Theological arguments and definitions of the nature of the deity, "from the beginning until now," are all secondary to this fact. Throughout the centuries no Christian theologian has dared to decree otherwise. Athanasius, Pelagius, Augustine, Arminius, Calvin, and Barth have all submitted to this dogma as primary to their faith. The gospels, the epistles of Paul, and the New Testament in general testify to the same end.

The will of God, therefore, must be interpreted, not indiscriminately in any subjective sense, but objectively, as far as that is possible, through the life and teaching of Jesus, as the will of his heavenly Father. What that will is may not be conveyed easily or simply through

the medium of a definition but only through careful perusal of the life of our Lord. On that basis, we find that the will of the Father was the welfare of his children *through judgment and redemption.* That final phrase is imperative. Jesus "went about doing good," he taught men and "healed many people of divers diseases"; but the welfare of God's children involved something more. It involved moral living that would be judged by his standards; and his standards in judgment and righteousness were absolute. It was because God's judgments were absolute that Jesus went to the cross. It was God's will that he should go. Had he not gone to the cross, that too would have been God's will, but it would not have brought with it redemption.

Here, I think, it is necessary to make a distinction between what I shall call God's will in a *primary* sense and God's will in a *secondary* sense. God's will in a primary sense, on this reasoning, involves absolute righteousness and begets absolute good. Such was the case when Jesus went to the cross. God's will in a secondary sense involves relative righteousness and begets relative good. Thus, had Jesus not gone to the cross, it would still have been God's will, but it would also have been God's will that the results would have been different. He would not have "visited and redeemed his people," and Jesus would have been something less than Saviour and Lord.

If the standards of God in judgment were not absolute righteousness, Jesus' sacrifice would be of no avail, and the whole fabric of Christianity would fall apart. This, then, is God's will—not just the welfare of his children, but the welfare of his children *through judgment and redemption.* And because this is his will, only absolute righteousness may beget absolute good, while relative righteousness may beget only relative good. This makes possible the distinction I have drawn between God's will in a primary and God's will in a secondary sense.

This distinction reconciles and explains two theories of God's will that too often appear irreconcilable. It reconciles and explains the apparently irreconcilables of predestination and free will. According to the doctrine of predestination, whatever is is the will of God: it has been so ordained "from the beginning of the world." According to the doctrine of free will, only that which is perfect is the will of God, that which is less than perfect being the will of man. The will of man may thus be contrary to and frustrate the will of God. My thesis is that, in a relative sense, this may be so; but ultimately whatever is is the will, not of man, but of God, since God's will involves judgment and righteousness, and these condition the *results* of all man's thoughts and acts. The free will of man and the free will of God thus are not contradictory; for God's will is judgment which is absolute and inevitable,

to which the will of man submits, not in its *motives,* but only in its *results.* If it submits in its motives, it is by an act of itself and not by any fiat of the Father.

It is a popular misapprehension that the will of man, being contrary to the absolute will of God, begets evils. The evidence of the Scriptures, particularly of that portion of the Scriptures which deals with the Passion of Jesus, does not show this. This is the more noteworthy in that, not only is the Passion of Jesus primary to all Christian doctrine, but it is one part of the gospels which modern scholarship has left intact. Even the dismembering influence of form criticism has left it unassailed. The Passion of Jesus tells us that it is not the will of man, but the will of God, which begets evil through his standards of judgment and righteousness. It tells us that God does not will good only, but rather that he wills judgment which is absolute, begetting good or evil according as man's will impinges on his.

Some time ago, in a popular religious work, I ran across the type of error I am inveighing against. The author cited a story which I paraphrase in my own words. It was a tale, taken from actual experience, in which the author related how, on one occasion, he had entered a home in the slums of London where a baby had died. When he entered the home, he found conditions of the very worst. The room was practically bare, what little furniture there was being arranged in a slipshod fashion; and in the middle of the room, on a broken-down chair, sat a woman with the dead child on some blankets before her. She was a woman of middle age, fat and slovenly in appearance, and smelled strongly of gin. As the minister entered she was weeping copious tears and, with her eyes on the dead child, repeating over and over again, "It's God's will, it's God's will."

The writer concluded his story with the moral that what he had seen was not God's will at all. The death of the child, he averred, had not been brought about by the will of God but by the will of its drunken and disreputable parents who, through the type of life they had lived, had handicapped its chances for existence even before it was born.

My estimate of that story and its moral is this: As a piece of practical sermonizing, it brings home a truth. It charges man with the inevitable responsibility that rests upon him for the conduct of his life and the effect his life might have on other people. My theory admits this, but it would change the author's emphasis and go one step further. The change of emphasis would be that, from the standpoint of *motive,* the child's death was the will of its parents, but in an ultimate sense—that is, in the sense of *results*—it was the will of God. God did not

will the death of the child, as such, but he did will that the parents' lives should be judged by his standards. The exact relationship between God's will and the death of the child, of course, cannot be easily established. It involves a consideration of natural as well as moral law, of science as well as theology. But that there is some relationship I am not the least in doubt.

The other aspect of God's will, as revealed to us in the Scriptures and through the life of our Lord, is redemption. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, God "hath visited and redeemed his people." From a rational standpoint this is a more difficult problem than the problem of judgment. We can see how, if God's standards are just, judgment must come. That is only reasonable. It is not so easy to see why redemption should come. In fact, it is as well to admit at the outset that this is not reasonable. It is unreasonable. Why should God invoke judgment and then produce pardon? Yet so we are asked to believe.

The secret again lies in the nature of God himself. If God is our heavenly Father, then we may expect in his person the attributes of an earthly father, only heightened. As an earthly father, in a relative sense, invokes judgment and yet will give pardon, so also our Father in heaven will do likewise, in an absolute sense. If we think of God as something other than Father, of course, this conception breaks down. Therefore, again, primary to our faith and to our understanding of God's will is this idea, which was vital for Jesus and cannot be too thoroughly stressed, that God is our heavenly Father.

How do we know that God is our heavenly Father? We do not know. We apprehend only through faith—faith, both in things seen and things unseen: in things seen, as in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus; in things unseen, as in the God in whom he believed. "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith": by faith we apprehend God as our heavenly Father and, having so apprehended, we may come to an understanding of that aspect of his will which makes for redemption. It is inherent in Christian belief that somehow God's redemption ultimately overrules or subsumes his judgment. This is the Christian overplus to the Jewish faith. Jehovah, the God of judgment and wrath, is the God finally arrived at in the Old Testament. This was the contribution to spiritual insight made by the great prophets dating from the eighth century B.C. The conception of God as a God of love as well as of judgment was brought to focus and fruition in the life and teaching of Jesus. Here we find the reasonableness of judgment opposed by the unreasonableness of redemption. The greatest

miracle in the life of Jesus, as a matter of fact, was not a miracle of the flesh but the miracle of redemption.

How difficult it is to understand the *why* of redemption and fit it into a logical scheme of things is seen in the problem it presented to the apostle Paul. Paul was a thinker, a logical thinker. His logic was not always above reproach in its results, but his method was sound. In addition, Paul was a Jew. Whether he was a Pharisee or not is a disputed point, but undoubtedly he inherited a strong Jewish sense of moral justness.

How hard it is for a man with a logical mind and a strong sense of moral justness to comprehend the scope of salvation! Certainly Paul found it so. All the more credit to him then, that, under the influence of the spirit of Christ, he realized the inadequacy of the edifice of logic and included all people in redemption through faith, when he could not include them through reason. The conclusions arrived at by Paul on this matter in Romans mark that letter as one of the key documents in the Christian faith. It is no wonder that more theologians than Karl Barth have turned to it as the chief New Testament work on which to base their theology.

In Christian history the aspect of God's will as redemption, arising from the conception of him as a God of love, has received varying degrees of emphasis according to the needs and nature of the times. In our own day this emphasis has been especially strong. The social gospel, with its concern for human need, has stressed the love of man as the corollary of the love of God; while in theology, liberalism and humanism, for the same reason, have tended to make a similar emphasis —only in the reverse order. They have stressed the love of God (if any) as the corollary of the love of man. In more recent developments, such as Barthianism and the New Orthodoxy, redemption is still given a prominent place; and the conception of God in the popular mind is increasingly against the God of the Old Testament and in favor of the God of the New.

Love rather than judgment is in popular favor today and, on the whole, it is well that it should be so. The Christian God is preëminently a God of love. Redemption is the ultimate note in the Christian symphony. But we must beware lest we fall into the cardinal error of assuming that God is *only* a God of love. The fact of redemption does not relieve us of the responsibility of moral living. The God of Jesus is the God of the Old Testament as well as the New, and we will do well to remember it.

If I appear to dwell at greater length on judgment than on redemption in this article, it is for this reason: Judgment rather than redemp-

tion, wrath rather than love, need to be stressed. That may seem a strange—almost a hard—saying in a world as sorely distracted as ours; but such I conceive to be the case. The fact of war has brought many things home to us that seemed far off before; but it has not brought home to enough of us the fact that irresponsibility is no way of solving human problems or of evading divine judgment.

The responsibility of moral living is with us, whether we accept it or no; and, if we believe in the brotherhood of man as the corollary of the Fatherhood of God, our scope of responsibility is coextensive with the universe. John Wesley conceived of the world as his parish; too many Christians have lost that world view today—at least, from the standpoint of responsibility. They can see how God's love is coextensive with the universe, and therefore God's redemption; they do not see that man's responsibility is also coextensive with the universe, because God's judgment is as universal as his redemption.

Judgment, therefore, is the aspect of God's will on which the emphasis needs to be laid today. Indeed, it is here apparently that the emphasis has always had to be laid. This is the word which was spoken by the prophets of the Old Testament, it is the word of John, and it is no less the word of Jesus. Jesus' ministry, in the fullest sense, was a ministry of redemption; but both his contemporaries and succeeding generations of Christian people have too often forgotten that it was a ministry of judgment as well. It was because Jesus measured up to God's judgment that man was redeemed. So, by measuring up to God's judgment today, we may help him in his work of redemption.

In the Pauline epistles we find this same evidence that judgment rather than redemption required to be stressed. Many people in the early Church, confident that they had been redeemed and buoyed up by the hope of the Parousia, regarded morality as a thing of the past. It was a major task in Paul's ministry to rectify this fault. As one commentator expresses it, "The earliest Christians, confident that Doomsday was near, were not concerned to frame an ethic for a world destined to speedy dissolution, and were in no wise prepared to issue directions for the multifarious problems of every day Christian conduct."[1] Modern scholarship has amply shown that one of the great debts that we owe to Paul we owe to his persistent emphasis on the necessity of moral living in the Christian life. In a day when Christian people were in danger of worshiping the gods of magic, when the prevailing tendency was to associate the Holy Spirit with abnormal and psycho-physical phenomena (as the ecstatic glossolalia prized by the Corinthians), Paul recalled men from their "debauch of religious emotion" and demanded

[1] A. M. Hunter, *Paul and His Predecessors*, p. 64.

that "all experiences, normal and abnormal, be brought to the Master's test—that of their ethical fruits."[2]

At this point it is necessary to introduce another factor into the discussion—namely, the church. Hitherto we have been discussing the problem as if no such institution existed. True, we have appealed to the gospels and to the Scriptures in general, which were a product of the church; but of the church in relation to God's will we have said not a word. It is impossible, however, to discuss God's will intelligently without reference to the church. Is not the church the vehicle for the expression of God's will in the world? Is not this that for which the church historically has stood? What then of the will of God with respect to the church?

The most admirable thesis on this subject is the monumental work of Ernst Troeltsch.[3] Troeltsch's theory is that historically the Christian church has been possessed, not of one ethic, but of two. It has been possessed, first, of an *absolute* ethic, based on the gospels, the standards of which are for that part of its people who have eschewed the ways of the world and dwell under the sanctity and protection of its power. This is especially true of the Roman Catholic Church with its monasteries and nunneries, but is also true of the church as a whole. It is possessed, second, of a *relative* ethic, with standards for those upon whom the stain and strain of the world cast their shadows both behind and before.

Only in the early church, Troeltsch claims, did this double ethic fail to appear. The reason for this was that the early church was not a "world" church. The church of the early Christians was a church *in* the world but not *of* the world. It was a "come-ye-apart" and "be-ye-separate" church. Its ethic, once it had acquired an ethic, was the absolute ethic and that alone.

Until the time of Constantine, when the Christian church became *of* the world as well as *in* it, this single ethic prevailed. With the transformation that then occurred, less strenuous ethical standards were required. The absolute ethic was all very well as long as Christianity was a minority religion with no influence on the affairs of state nor over the lives of the people in general. Once it broadened its sphere of influence, however, it had to broaden its ethical laws. A niche was retained for those who wished to continue under the old standards, but for the majority of the people the new relative ethic was set up.

From the standpoint of historical analysis it will be seen that

[2] A. M. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[3] *The Social Teaching of the Christian Church*, translated by Olive Wyon.

Troeltsch's theory has performed a service both useful and unique. From the standpoint of God's will, however, a further word needs to be said. From the standpoint of God's will there is, was, and ever will be, but one ethic; for his will in all things is absolute. Whether his will be employed in a primary or a secondary sense, it is primary or secondary only in results, from judgments that are permanent and sure.

What Troeltsch calls the absolute ethic of the church, from God's standpoint, is not an absolute ethic at all. It is a relative ethic. If Jesus' life be accepted as a criterion, the man who lives by himself apart from the world, or in a community of his fellows apart from the world, is as short of perfection as the man who lives in sin *in* the world. His is an absolute ethic only as it applies to his own personal conduct *as far as that conduct goes.* If his conduct does not bring him into contact with his fellow men, it is a relative ethic to that extent. Jesus does not make his summation of the law love to God only. Rather, he says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . *and thy neighbor as thyself!*" No ethic is an absolute ethic which fails to meet both of these demands.

In other words, while Troeltsch's analysis is shrewd and able, it must be recognized that the ethic to which he refers is not the ethic which is the corollary of the will of God but the ethic of the church; and that is altogether another affair. The ethic of the church, whether relative or absolute, is relative in the sight of God. The church is the vehicle for preserving and portraying his will in the world as far as man may portray it; but the ethic of the church and the ethic of God are two different things. This is not to blame or condemn the church. No one who loves the church will wantonly blame or condemn her. Rather, it is an admission that all who love the church must make, that, at best, she is an imperfect vehicle for the conveying of his will, a muddied mirror that reflects only in part.

Thus it appears to me that historically the Christian church may have had two ethics which, for convenience, we may call relative and absolute; yet from the standpoint of God's will, there is only one ethic, which is absolute, unattained, and unattainable by man, and that all ethics that man posits short of this are relative ethics. Thus, the ethic of those who seek perfection in solitude, or the ethic of any specially-privileged churchly class, or the ethic of any who *in* the world deem themselves to be not *of* the world, as well as the ethic of those who live by everyday commerce or toil, are all ethics in this relative sense.

Having said that, however, at least two questions remain to be answered. First, in practice, what should be the relationship between our relative ethics and God's absolute ethic? and second, when and

how far are the relative and absolute ethics of the church justifiable in human conduct? In experience, the two questions dovetail into one another and the answers, for that reason, cannot be kept separate.

The distinction which I have made between man's ethics and the ethic of God is especially important for our day. It denies the absoluteness of the perfectionism in which many Christians would hide amid the strains and stresses that wrack our sorely torn world. This is not to say that there may not be a place for perfectionism and the perfectionist among us. Undoubtedly there is. He recalls us to certain standards of judgment that we might otherwise overlook. The point is that, from the standpoint of the will of God, perfectionism, no less than what we sometimes like to call realism, is a relative ethic.

If one man looks on the world and decides to do, not the best but the "least bad" thing, and another man holds himself aloof from the issue altogether and quotes Holy Scripture and his own reasoning to justify his not coming to grips with the problem, they are neither one of them acting on the absolute ethic of God, although the perfectionist rather than the other man may claim to do so. In each case theirs is a relative ethic of their own designing, and no relative ethic may be equated with the judgment of the will of God. Yet what they do in each case will be God's will; but it will be God's will in a secondary and not in a primary sense.

As with individuals, so also with the church. Not infrequently we hear it asked, What is the function of the church in the world today? We are rather tired of the statement, "Let the Church be the Church." We want something more definite. Is it the function of the church to stand apart as a so-called example (perfectionism)? Or is it to compromise and make the best of things? The church, because it includes in its membership a heterogeneous body of people, may in some part approximate both of these functions; but that only makes the choice the more difficult for the individual Christian and especially for the individual minister by whose decision more than one life may be swayed.

Many a minister, faced with the exigencies of the times, has found himself floundering between these two stones. If he adopts the one point of view, he is bound to feel the futility of apparent inaction in a time of action; if he adopts the other, he is bound to feel a lowering or a cheapening of the ideals he was once resolved to keep. In either case there is, or should be, a feeling of frustration, disillusionment, and doubt. The danger comes when there is none of these; for when there is none of these, there is lacking the first requisite of a truly Christian life—namely, a consciousness of sin. And the danger is more

likely to come to the perfectionist than to the other man. The man who knows he compromises is at least on the threshold of becoming conscious of sin; the man whose idea of religion is that he must not compromise, *and who believes that he does not compromise,* sins and remains in ignorance of it. It is a primary requisite in the lives of all Christians to realize that "we have all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God." This is the inevitable corollary of the fact that absolute judgment is an integral part of God's will.

The dilemma of the perfectionist and the realist is not new in Christian history. It was this dilemma, as Troeltsch shows, which was responsible for the double ethic in the life of the church. The origin of the realist dates from Christianity's first contact with the world at large. It dates from the time that the first Christian stopped and asked himself how he could be a Christian and yet live in the world. When he decided to compromise, and knew that he was compromising, he became Christianity's first realist. The origin of the perfectionist dates back to a misapprehension of the cross itself. The reasoning seems to have been that because Jesus was perfection he was also a perfectionist. The answer to that assumption is that Jesus submitted himself to the judgment of the will of God and was not found wanting. No man had done this before and no man has done it since. In Christian experience, one way or another, we are faced with the necessity of compromise. The perfectionist and the realist each compromises in his own way. Each admits the ethic of God as the absolute ethic; yet each, consciously or unconsciously, finds himself forced into subservience to a relative ethic. The facts of life make it impossible to be otherwise.

What then? Is the absolute ethic to be forgotten? Are we to adopt an adventist attitude and postpone its realization to a future life? How are we to escape from the danger of inertia that compromise brings?

It is my conviction that the absolute ethic has a very definite part to play in the scheme of things here and now. To begin with, a recognition of the absolute ethic is essential to a consciousness of sin. If we recognized no absolute ethic, we would not know that our relative ethic was relative. In the second place, a recognition of the absolute ethic removes the danger of complacency and inertia and eliminates the tendency to irresponsibility. Thirdly, a recognition of the absolute ethic gives us a guide for establishing the principle by means of which we may determine when it is our duty to compromise and when not to compromise. The absolute ethic of the church, as well as the absolute ethic of God, may be said to serve this same function.

In Christian history it has never been enough to say, "We must

compromise." The spirit of historic Christianity has been embodied rather in the statement, "We must compromise, but——" That "but" spells all the difference. It implies that, though we compromise now, nevertheless we press onward. It implies that we are not satisfied with compromise and establishes the principle on which compromise must be based.

That principle is traceable in the impact that Christianity has made in many aspects of human life. It is traceable, for example, in the history of Christianity's long battle against slavery. According to the absolute ethic, slavery was wrong. The consciences of some Christian people never forgot that. But before that phase of the absolute ethic could be realized, many steps had to be taken which implied compromise under a relative ethic. Compromise, because of the nature of the case, was a matter of policy, but it was the absolute ethic that determined in what direction the compromise should be. It was the absolute ethic that kept Christian people hoping, working, and praying for a better compromise, and that leaves us still unsatisfied on the question of racial relationships even today. In the same way we may trace Christianity's attitude to the question of war. We have not been as successful in our fight against war as we have been in our battle against slavery, but such progress as has been made has accrued because we have never been satisfied with compromise as such. Despite obstacles and defeats, the absolute ethic is still our ideal. We compromise, but——

Of course there are some things with regard to which a Christian position admits of no compromise. Martin Luther is not the only Christian who has found himself in a position where he must say, "Here I stand. I can no other. So help me God." We compromise from the standpoint of policy or expediency only, but we never forget that compromise is not our absolute goal.

The danger to the perfectionist is that, even if he realizes that his perfectionism is based on a relative ethic, he will refuse compromise as an article of policy that may achieve ultimate good; the danger to the realist is that, realizing that his realism is based on a relative ethic, he may forget the absolute ethic of God which establishes the principle on which compromise should be based.

In our lives, as in the life of Jesus, the will of God should be the determinative factor for all action. We may not be able to ascertain that will as certainly as he did, nor may we be able to realize it in the same degree. But if we are aware of some of its ramifications and implications in our lives, and alive to the dangers both of compromise and perfection, we are in a fair way to becoming his disciples, in fact as well as by profession of faith.

CADMUS AND THE GREEK ALPHABET

WILLIAM NICKERSON BATES

University of Pennsylvania

The statement of Herodotus (v, 58) that Phœnicians with Cadmus introduced among the Greeks letters which in his opinion they did not have before has long been a subject of debate among those who were interested in the history of the alphabet. By some it was accepted as a historical fact; by others it was wholly discredited. No general agreement has been possible hitherto because arguments might be brought forward to support either contention. Archæological discoveries in recent years have, however, brought forth new facts which throw much light on this old problem, if indeed they do not altogether solve it. It is the object of this paper to examine this new evidence and to point out that it seems to indicate that the words of Herodotus may in one sense be regarded as correct, but not in the sense commonly attributed to them.[1]

At the outset of this inquiry it is necessary to look at the whole passage in Herodotus, for his statement about the letters is introduced casually. He has explained that Harmodius and Aristogeiton who murdered Hipparchus were men of the race of Gephyræans who, he had ascertained by inquiry (*ἀναπυνθανόμενος εὑρίσκω*), were descended from the Phœnicians who had come with Cadmus to Boeotia.[2] He continues (58):

> These Phœnicians who came with Cadmus, to whom the Gephyræans belonged, when they settled in this country introduced many other arts among the Greeks and also letters, which the Greeks in my opinion (*ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν*) did not have before. First they used those which all the Phœnicians also use; but as time went on at the same time with the sound they changed the form of the letters. The Greeks who dwelt about them at that time were for the most part Ionians,[3] who having received the letters from the Phœnicians by instruction changed a few of them and used them, and when they used them they spoke of them as Phœnician letters as was right, in as much as the Phœnicians had introduced them into Greece.

This then is the source of the theory that the Phœnicians invented the alphabet.[4]

Herodotus then goes on to say that he had actually seen some of

[1] It is hardly necessary to say that a very extensive literature has grown up concerning the origin of the alphabet, and that it is not my purpose in this discussion to examine the various theories in detail.

[2] How and Wells in their *Commentary on Herodotus,* Vol. II, p. 25, point out that Gephyra was another name for Tanagra (cf. also Strabo, ix, p. 404) and that it is very unlikely that the Gephyræans had any connection with the people whom we call Phœnicians; that their own tradition that they came from Eubœa is more probable. In other words they were not Semites.

[3] The only Ionian Greeks living near them were the Athenians.

[4] Diodorus Siculus, v, 57, 5 apparently has this passage in mind.

these "Cadmean" letters engraved on tripods in the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, and quotes three inscriptions in which they were used. One of these purported to be a dedication of Amphitryon, whom he calls a contemporary of Laius, fourth in descent from Cadmus. The second bore the name of a certain Scæus, a pugilist of the time of Œdipus, the son of Laius, though Herodotus is doubtful of his identity. The third was a dedication of Laodamas, the son of Eteocles, the son of Œdipus. That Herodotus saw these inscriptions there can be little doubt; but that they were written in what we know as the Phœnician alphabet, or that they dated from the periods to which he ascribed them is almost certainly incorrect. It is a well-known fact that in Greece not only were old inscriptions often recut as changes in the forms of letters on extant stones show; but they were also rewritten or added at dates far later than those which they professed to represent. Thus in certain temples in classical times there were dedications attributed to various mythical, or semi-mythical heroes of an early age. For example, in the temple of Athena at Lindus in Rhodes the great inscription[5] cut in the year 99 B.C. records that in as much as many of the oldest monuments in that shrine and the inscriptions upon them had become injured by time a decree was passed providing for a committee of two men to arrange for a slab upon which should be inscribed from various sources a record of the offerings. Then follows a list. There is mention of a bronze bowl dedicated by Cadmus[6] "inscribed in Phœnician letters"; also dedications by Minos, Heracles, Rhesus, Telephus, Menelaus, Helen, and many others. Here the "Phœnician letters" like the "Cadmean letters" seen by Herodotus at Thebes were almost certainly archaic forms of Greek letters added by the priests to give the dignity of age to the offerings.

It is well to recall here that the statement of Herodotus that the Greeks got their letters from the Phœnicians does not stand alone. Thus Æschylus, writing about a generation before Herodotus, had attributed the invention of the alphabet to Prometheus,[7] that is, he thought it had a purely Greek origin; and Stesichorus (640-555 B.C.) a century earlier attributed it to Palamedes,[8] one of the heroes of the Trojan War, who was certainly not a Semite, but an Achæan. In late Greek times various theories existed, for example, that Palamedes invented it;[9] or introduced it;[10] or invented four letters *(i.e., Z, Θ, Φ,* and *X)*.[11] Orpheus, Museus,

[5] C. Blinkenberg, *Die lindische Tempelchronik*, Bonn, 1915.

[6] Κάδμος λέβητα χάλκεον Φοινικικοῖς γράμμασι ἐπιγεγραμμένον, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Πολύζαλος ἐν τῷ Δ τῶν ἱστοριῶν.

[7] *Prom. Vinct.* 460.

[8] Bergk, *Poetæ Lyr. Græc.* III, p. 219, No. 34.

[9] Anon. in Cod. Vat. 711, fol. B, quoted by Franz, *Elementa Epigraphices Græcæ*, p. 12; Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* iv, 33.

[10] Schol. to Euripides, *Ores.* 432.

[11] Plutarch, *Symp.* ix, 3, 2.

and Linus are others who were credited with its introduction into Greece. Again others still were said to have invented certain letters: Epicharmus Ξ and Ψ; and Simonides of Ceos Η and Ω. The only value that these late Greek statements have today is to show that the belief that the Greek alphabet had a Phœnician origin was not universally held in antiquity. In fact, Diodorus Siculus living in the time of Augustus declared[12] that the Cretans invented it and that the Phœnicians changed the type of the letters and extended the knowledge of them.

We must now consider what may be said for and against a Phœnician source. Apart from the words of Herodotus two arguments are usually brought forward in support of the theory. First stress is laid on the fact the names of some of the Greek letters are clearly derived from Phœnician, that is, that they have a meaning in the Phœnician language; and second it is noted that many of the letters of early Greek inscriptions are essentially the same in form as early Phœnician letters. Both arguments need careful examination.

The Phœnician alphabet consists of twenty-two letters, the names of twelve of which J. P. Peters years ago[13] showed are words with meanings. A few others have a meaning in other Semitic languages than Phœnician, but that leaves *he, zayin, teth, lamed, samek, tsade, koph* and probably *gimel* unaccounted for. In other words, eight of the names of the Phœnician letters appear not to be Phœnician words, that is, they had some other origin. Consequently any Greek letter names derived from them must also go back to some other source than Phœnician. Again, where the Greek names clearly came from the Phœnician, the characters sometimes have an entirely different phonetic value in the two alphabets. Thus the name *alpha* is evidently derived from *aleph,* but does not have the same value as *aleph.* In fact, to explain the Greek vowels it was necessary to assume that they were derived from Phœnician consonants because, as one writer rather naïvely declares,[14] vowels were more important than consonants in Greek.

Furthermore, the statement that early Greek writing resembles Phœnician needs modification. First it should be remembered that in early Greek times there was not one alphabet, but a variety of alphabets. These local, or epichoric, alphabets often differed radically from one another in some of their forms and values as well as from the Phœnician. Thus equals *E* in the alphabet of Sicyon, while in Megara has that value, and the value of *B*. It is needless to multiply examples. Some of these peculiar local forms cannot possibly be derived from Phœnician

[12] V, 74, 1.
[13] *Jour. Am. Or. Soc.* XXII (1901), pp. 176 ff.; also Zimmern and various other scholars.
[14] O. Eissfeldt, "Zum Frage nach dem Ursprung unseres Alphabets," in *Forschungen und Fortschritte,* XIV (1938), pp. 4 ff.

originals, and others are more primitive than the earliest Phœnician. Once more, where a Greek letter has a form similar to a Phœnician letter it should have the same value if derived from it. Thus the letter (if derived from *gimel* should have the value of *gamma* in all the Greek alphabets where it occurs; but it does not. It has that value in the alphabet of Laconia; but it stands for *beta* in the alphabets of Paros, Delos, Naxos, etc.; for *pi* at Gortyna in Crete; and for *omicron* in Melos.

One other difficulty comes in finding an explanation for the so-called supplementary letters of the Greek alphabet, that is, for Υ, Φ, Χ, Ψ, and Ω. No one of these letters is found in the Phœnician alphabet, and in former years many ingenious devices were resorted to in order to explain them. One has only to look at the pages of Larfeld's *Griechische Epigraphik* for examples of the attempts to trace them back to Phœnician.

The result then of this examination of the evidence so far indicates that although some of the names of the Greek letters clearly had a Semitic derivation, and some of their forms resembled Phœnician forms, others did not. In other words, the theory of a Phœnician origin for the Greek alphabet calls for serious revision.

To return to the passage in Herodotus. If Cadmus, a Phœnician, settled at Thebes and introduced the Phœnician alphabet to the Greeks, there ought to be Phœnician remains there, if not Phœnician inscriptions. Thebes has been very carefully excavated, but nothing Phœnician has been brought to light. On the other hand abundant "Mycenæan" remains have been found there including inscriptions. In 1923 the Greek archæologist Keramopoullos discovered in a storeroom of the palace on the Cadmea a great number of Mycenæan stirrup cups, some of which bore inscriptions. They were new cups and had never been used. The characters on them are those of Minoan Crete linear script B. They date from shortly before 1400 B.C. when the palace was destroyed. On three of these cups the same inscription appears, which A. W. Persson[15] with the help of the Cypriote syllabary reads *ku-te-me-se* | *va-na* | *te-i-vo-e*. This he translates "Cadmus, king of Thebes." On two other cups he reads *si-ka* | *va-na* | *go-lo-ke*. The first word he thinks may be a proper name, Sikas; and the last word he associates with the Bœotian place name Glechon. Other cups have similar inscriptions in which Persson finds the word *vana*. Whether these interpretations are correct or not they are satisfactory evidence for the use of Minoan-Mycenæan writing at Thebes about 1400 B.C.

It should, perhaps, be recalled here that when Sir Arthur Evans excavated the palace at Cnossus, near the modern Candia in Crete, one of the surprises was the discovery of a large number of clay tablets

[15] *Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift*, 1930, Program 3, pp. 28 ff.

inscribed in unknown characters; and that the study of them proved that they fall into three classes: the hieroglyphic, linear script A, and linear script B, the last being the most fully developed form. Prototypes may be found in these three kinds of Minoan writing for all the characters in the early Greek alphabets except *B*, *N*, and *Ω*, and these may be paralleled when more material comes to light. It was natural, therefore, that Evans and other scholars, too, should see in these characters the source of the alphabet.[16] There were, however, two objections to that theory: one that it failed to account for the Semitic element in the names of the Greek letters; and the other that the values of the Cretan characters were unknown.

Since the discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans at Cnossus writing in some form of Minoan script has been found, usually in small amounts, in many parts of Greece. But a most remarkable discovery was made by C. W. Blegen and K. Kourouniotis[17] in 1938 in the "Palace of Nestor," at a place called Ano Englianos, which they identified with ancient Pylos in southwestern Peloponnesus. Here in a storeroom were found some six hundred tablets written in a slightly modified form of the Minoan linear script B, but dating from the end of the thirteenth century. These together with the small finds just mentioned furnish proof that writing was well known and practiced in Greece between the years 1400 and 1200 B.C. As Blegen has pointed out it is probably only an accident that tablets similar to those from Ano Englianos were not found at Tiryns and Mycenæ. They must have been there. Up to the present time only a very few of these new tablets have been published; hence there has been no opportunity to study them in detail. We do not yet have a complete list of the characters used on them, nor do we know whether or not the language in which they are written is Greek. Their date, however, can be established beyond dispute.

We must now consider how all this concerns Cadmus and the history of the alphabet. In 1924 E. Forrer showed[18] from a large cuneiform tablet from the Hittite archives of Boghazkeui that in the fourteenth century B.C. there was an Achæan conquest of much of Asia Minor. He identified the names of several Achæan rulers including Atreus, and showed that for several generations Achæans were powerful in that whole region. Forrer's conclusions were much discussed and vigorously disputed, but they seem to be confirmed by subsequent discoveries. Mycenæan pottery has been found at many places in Asia Minor and Syria; and at Ialysus in Rhodes, where such an abundance of it has been

[16] I myself once advocated such a theory. See "The Origin of the Greek Alphabet," in *University of Pennsylvania Lectures*, 1916, pp. 380-396 and table p. 383.

[17] *Am. Jour. Arch.* XLIII (1939), pp. 557 ff.

[18] *Mitt. der Deutsch. Orient Gesellschaft* No. 63, March 1924.

brought to light, the citadel was actually called Achæa.[19] More important still in 1933 there were found at Ras Shamra (modern Latakia, ancient Egyptian Ugarit), in Northern Syria tombs of Achæan kings[20] containing Mycenæan material, thus proving the Mycenæan conquest and occupation of that region in the fourteenth century B.C. Mycenæan tombs had previously been discovered on other sites, for example, at Minet-el-Beida.

The question whether the people whom we designate as "Mycenæan," that is, the inhabitants of the greater part of Greece in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C., can rightly be called Achæans is one about which opinions have differed. There can be no doubt that the civilization which existed at Mycenæ at that time was largely derived from Minoan Crete; and in the present state of the evidence it seems very probable that the inhabitants of Cnossus who wrote the tablets found there spoke some other language than Greek. It seems hardly possible that with all the intensive study devoted to these tablets since their discovery they should not have been read if they were in Greek. This, however, does not prove that the inhabitants of the Greek mainland between 1400 and 1200 B.C. were not a Greek speaking people; that is, it does not prove that they were not Achæans. Greek tradition is unanimous in affirming that Agamemnon and his colleagues who won the Trojan War at the beginning of the twelfth century were Achæans, and as such they must have spoken Greek. And here it is well to remember that Greek tradition also declared that there were two Argive dynasties, the Perseids and the Pelopids. The first may perhaps be represented by the burials in the Shaft Graves at Mycenæ. These people may have spoken the language of Minoan Crete; while the Pelopids to whom the house of Agamemnon belonged came later and were Greek speaking Achæans. This problem will probably be solved when the tablets found by Blegen in the palace at Ano Englianos can be read. Certainly Nestor was an Achæan of the Achæans according to Homer.[21] All this is important for the question of the origin of the Greek alphabet.

In the spring of 1929 there were found at Ras Shamra clay tablets[22] dating from the fourteenth century B.C. and inscribed in what the excavators have called "alphabetic cuneiform." Many more were brought to light by subsequent excavations, and in 1934 two stone votive *stelæ* similarly inscribed.[23] The characters are cuneiform, but they represent letters and so differ from the well-known cuneiform writing of Babylonia.

[19] Diodorus Siculus, v, 57, 6.

[20] See, *e.g.*, C. F. A. Schaeffer, *Illustrated London News*, No. 2445, March 3, 1934, pp. 323 ff. Tomb No. 4 is well illustrated *ibid.* p. 324.

[21] In *Iliad* xi, 759 he is represented as calling his people Achæans.

[22] *Syria*, X (1929), pp. 295 ff.

[23] *Syria*, XVI (1935), pl. xxxi. See also J. Obermann, *Jour. Am. Or. Soc.* LXI (1940), pp. 31 ff.

There are twenty-nine of them in all, representing twenty-seven sounds.[24] Nothing like this was previously known, and from the evidence now available it appears to have been a local invention. For its origin it must go back to the Babylonian cuneiform. In fact, H. Bauer in his book on the alphabet gives a list of the letters and the Babylonian signs from which they were derived.[25] This Ras Shamra script is then an example of true alphabetic writing. It was not, of course, the first time that written characters were made to stand for single sounds, that is, that they had the value of letters. As has often been pointed out, the Egyptians as early as the fourth millennium B.C. had twenty-four characters which they used as letters in combination with syllabic signs; yet their writing never became really alphabetic.

Alphabetic writing, it should be added here, has also been claimed for the early inscriptions from Sinai, the first of which were found by Petrie in 1905. Others have since been brought to light. They are all short, and the characters in which they are written are peculiar and appear to stand for the initial letters of Semitic words represented by Egyptian pictures. They would thus have an Egyptian derivation. The question of their date has been much debated, but they appear to go back to about 1500 B.C.[26]

Important also in our present discussion is the question of the language in which the Ras Shamra tablets are written. The excavators called it Phœnician; others have called it Canaanite. J. Cantineau[27] says it is neither Phœnician nor Canaanite nor Aramæan, but a hitherto unknown Semitic language, that is, the language used in the region of Ras Shamra before the Aramæan conquest. More recently, however, A. Guérinot after a careful study declares emphatically that the language is early Phœnician.[28] The conclusions which he arrives at are in his own words these: "La langue de Ras Shamra est donc celle que parlaient les Phéniciens avant l'époque des inscriptions classiques: c'est le proto-phénicien, ou phénicien archaïque." In the light of this expert opinion it seems safe to conclude that the language is Phœnician as spoken in the fourteenth century B.C.

In 1923 there was found on the site of ancient Byblus (the modern

[24] See Hans Bauer, *Der Ursprung des Alphabets*, Leipsig, 1937, pl. xiii; also by the same author *Die alphabetischen Keilschrifttexte von Ras Schamra*, pp. 64 ff.

[25] Pls. vi and vii. This is a very different theory from that advocated long ago by various scholars, *e.g.*, Deecke (*Zeit. Morg. Ges.* 1877, pp. 102 ff.), Peiser (*Mitt. Vorderas. Ges.* 1900, pp. 43 ff.), Hommel (*Gesch. Bab. und Assyr.* pp. 51 ff.), Grimme (*Zeit. Assyr.* 1907, pp. 49 ff.), and others, that the Phœnician alphabet was developed from Babyonian cuneiform.

[26] For a discussion of them see H. Grimme, *Althebräische Inschriften von Sinai*, Hannover, 1923.

[27] *Syria*, XIII (1932), pp. 168 f.

[28] *Syria*, XIX (1938), pp. 38 ff.

Jebeil), about a hundred miles south of Ras Shamra, a sarcophagus bearing an inscription in what we know as the Phœnician alphabet, but about four hundred years earlier than any Phœnician inscription previously known. This is the so-called Ahiram inscription.[29] It may be dated in the latter part of the thirteenth century by the Mycenæan pottery found with it, as well as by two alabaster vases bearing the cartouches of Ramses II. On the side of the pit in which the sarcophagus was placed, about half way up, was another inscription cut in the soft stone in the same alphabet and of the same date. The forms of the letters in these two inscriptions naturally differ in some respects from the forms which appear on the *Moabite Stone,* formerly the earliest Phœnician inscription known, which dates from about 830 B.C. The question now arises as to what caused the Phœnicians of Northern Syria to change from an alphabet made up of cuneiform characters to the alphabet which we call Phœnician. The answer to that question is in my opinion the answer to the old problem of the origin of the alphabet; and that answer I think can now be given with considerable assurance. It was the Achæan conquest and occupation of that region in the latter part of the fourteenth, or beginning of the thirteenth, century B.C. Forrer's discoveries among the tablets from Boghazkeui, confirmed by the finding of the tombs of Achæan kings at Ras Shamra, seem to make certain that there was such a conquest at that time. These Achæan conquerors undoubtedly brought Minoan-Mycenæan writing with them. It could not have been otherwise, such writing was so widespread both in Crete and on the mainland of Greece at that time. The Ras Shamra letters were wholly unsuitable for writing on stone as the two inscribed *stelæ* already mentioned show. On the other hand the characters used by the Achæan invaders were well adapted to such writing. What is more natural than that a people clever enough to have evolved alphabetic writing, as the inhabitants of Ras Shamra appear to have done, should change from clumsy and awkward forms to others that were simpler and more convenient when such forms came to their notice? This does not imply that the Minoan-Mycenæan script was alphabetic. It probably was not, or it would not have had so many characters; and, furthermore, the Cypriote syllabary which seems to have been derived from it is not alphabetic. If this conclusion is correct, it would mean that while the Phœnicians of Northern Syria got their alphabetic forms from their Achæan conquerors, these Achæans in return got their idea of alphabetic writing from them. That is what Cadmus brought to Greece. The old Minoan-Mycenæan forms were used as far as they were needed, but used for a new purpose, that is, to stand

[29] *Syria,* V (1924), pp. 135 ff. The inscription is on one short side and along one long side of the sarcophagus. The words are separated by upright lines as in both the Ras Shamra and Minoan-Mycenæan writing.

for letters; though whether any of them had values similar to those that they had at Cnossus or Mycenæ cannot yet be told.

This being the case, we are now in a position to understand the Semitic element in the names of the Greek letters. Some of these may well go back to old Babylonian writing as Delitsch[30] long ago and others[31] thought. Other names may have been suggested by the shapes of the Minoan characters. Others still which have no Semitic meaning may have taken the names which the Minoans had given them. Such a theory would account for the names which are Semitic and those which are not, as well as for the forms of the letters.

Who, then, was Cadmus? Not a Semite certainly; but a Phœnician nevertheless if that name may rightly be applied to the Achæans living in parts of Asia Minor and Syria in the fourteenth century B.C. and later. He was probably the descendant of one of the Achæan princes who conquered that region. When the Achæans were driven out of Syria, or left it voluntarily, they naturally went back to the land from which they had originally come, that is, to Greece. This explains why there are no Phœnician remains at Thebes but an abundance of things which are Mycenæan. The Greeks needed characters for their alphabet which the Phœnicians did not need, and for them they went back to the same source as for their other letters, namely, to Minoan-Mycenæan writing.

If this is so, another difficult question still remains to be answered, that is, the date at which alphabetic writing was introduced into Greece. We have already seen the Minoan-Mycenæan writing was in use at Pylos as late as the thirteenth century B.C. Perhaps it was in that century that the Greek alphabet was adopted. Greek tradition about the date of Cadmus is so hopelessly confused that no help can be obtained from that source. It should, however, be mentioned that according to one account he lived in the fourteenth century.

My conclusions, then, are these: 1. The people of Northern Syria had evolved a complete alphabet by the fourteenth century B.C. 2. They discarded their awkward cuneiform characters in the thirteenth century for forms which they learned from the Achæan settlers in their land. 3. The Achæans in return learned the idea of alphabetic writing from these Phœnicians. 4. Cadmus was a historical personage. He was an Achæan who had lived in Syria and, therefore, might be called a Phœnician. 5. He brought to Greece the knowledge of alphabetic writing, perhaps in the thirteenth century B.C. 6. The forms of his letters were derived from Minoan-Mycenæan writing.

[30] *Entstehung des ältesten Schriftsystems*, pp. 228 ff.
[31] *E.g.*, H. Zimmern, *Zeit. Morg. Ges.* L, pp. 667 ff.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE WAY OF THE CROSS

AMOS N. WILDER

Andover Newton Theological School

EXTENSIVE groups of Christian ministers and theological students together with a wide representation of Christian youth took their stand some years ago upon the issues of war, armament, military training, and allied topics. The particular circumstances under which they reached their pacifist convictions at that time would be worth considering, as in the case of the immense numbers of British youth who signed the Oxford Pledge at about the same time, but the groups of whom we speak felt that the decisive considerations in their position were Christian insights of a universal and changeless character. For the most part these men and women have adhered to these supposed obligations of Christian discipleship down to the present emergency. The result has been an extraordinary division and inconclusiveness among Christians as regards the basic religious presuppositions of political action today. Not only have Christians divided upon the issue of pacifism, but many non-pacifists have been sufficiently influenced by the pacifists to be hesitant in their social leadership. On the other hand the assuredness of the pacifist group has been shaken by recent developments and by clearer recognition of the logic of their position. Apart from differences in political judgments on today's conflict, Christians are widely confused as to the most elementary matters of Christian ethics, the role of Christians in society, and the relation of church and state.

There are two areas where our thinking has to begin in these matters of Christian citizenship and war. With the first we are not here concerned, namely, the actual teaching of Jesus as it relates to these questions. The results here tend to be inconclusive because one can always make a persuasive case for the special character and extraordinary circumstances, eschatological or otherwise, of his ministry. But the real strength of the pacifist position has been felt to rest not so much in Jesus' teaching as in his life and death, his "way," the way of the Cross. Non-pacifist Christians have had to recognize the authority for them of Jesus' method of spiritual victory through suffering, and have not wished to deny it. This argument more than any other explains the immense hold that pacifist convictions have won in our time over a generation ready to make Christianity vital and to pay the price to do it.

Yet even those most persuaded by this emphasis, ever more and more aware of the extremes to which unchecked human frenzy and

anarchy can go, have felt that the position was not fully satisfactory, that it was too simple, and as a result we have heard a great deal about the varying vocations of Christians, about divergent callings and testimonies. Thus Christians have conceded each other's convictions without pressing home the urgent main inquiry as to the character of Christian ethics and social action.

Our purpose here is to open up the assumptions underlying the pacifist view, especially with regard to the "method of the Cross," and to ask what is the exact relevance of this method to modern discipleship. Our method will be to comment upon the opening axioms of a typical formulation of this view, namely, a leaflet entitled *The Christian Pacifist Faith,* an "affirmation" very widely circulated a few years ago and signed by well-known Christians of all denominations. Upon these assertions the whole pacifist case is built, and the logic of it leads far beyond the particular issue of war.

"We believe that God is the Father of all mankind." Yes, but even here we may point out that many of God's sons are viewed in the New Testament as belonging to the category of minors and servants rather than as sons in the full sense, and therefore as subject to a regime characterized as "law" rather than grace. That is, they are incapable of true freedom, and there is a degree of impersonality and duress in God's relation to them, though behind that duress is love. Not only is this Paul's teaching, but it is implied in Jesus' teaching, for example, in his designation of his true family, not to mention the distinction between servants and friends that we find in the Gospel of John.

"His will as revealed in Jesus Christ is universal love." It is also holy love, so that to avoid sentimentality it is necessary to recall that God's love is "hot with wrath" to our sins as even the mild Whittier states it. Jesus lucidly warns men that they are exposed to destructive action in their "Father's world," destructive action proceeding from the providence of God himself. And Paul writes that the gospel, both as divine action and message, is like a life-giving and death-dealing perfume or odor, "a savor of life unto life, and a savor of death unto death." God's love is love with a purpose, and that purpose conditions it.

"Christ's gospel involves the faith that evil can be overcome only by good." The statement that evil can be overcome only by good is a very general, even abstract, one. For this reason, though it be true, one may fairly scrutinize its precise relevance. Moral evil, let us say, can only be overcome by good; malice is intensified and provoked when it meets with malice. To be overcome malice must meet with invincible good will, devoid of all resistance. Even if it meet with dispassionate resistance it will take fuel from such resistance, it is claimed. Certainly

the "way of the Cross" as we see it exemplified in Jesus and in Isaiah 53 abjures even dispassionate resistance. Yet malice, if it be viewed as a sickness or a fever, a temporary alienation, may well "come to itself" when put under dispassionate constraint, as we see in the case of children.

But it is perhaps a question whether group aggressions of an evil kind are chiefly characterized by malice. Let us suppose rather that they are characterized in the main by cupidity, though malice will evidently be involved in the ensuing conflict. Will cupidity be overcome only by good, that is, by non-resistant relinquishment? Will it be intensified by refusal? We should aver rather that frustration of greed, even if it does not cure the appetite, will definitely discourage the expression of it in the way of violence. Malice grows by opposition; rapacity diminishes. To conclude this brief scrutiny of the matter we can admit that moral evil cannot be overcome by evil, but it is a question whether dispassionate resistance is evil. It is also a question whether the evil spirit ever comes to itself without first entering into collision with the order of law which it has transgressed. It is true that one way in which the evildoer confronts that order is when he sees its penalties redemptively borne by the innocent.

In the meantime is it not possible that the ravages and outrages of impenitent men and groups can be partially confined and kept under control by dispassionate action that is not evil even though it makes no claim to be redemptive? As a matter of fact did not the founders of Christianity assume, Paul explicitly, a framework of social authority and cosmic authority, social sanctions and cosmic sanctions, within which the redemptive processes of good are at work? The Christian movement in its early stages took for granted the existence of social and political authority, and for that reason Jesus could say, "Who made me a judge or divider over you?" and Paul, "For what have I to do with judging them that are without?" and refer approvingly to "the powers that be" as "ordained of God." In so far as they challenged social authority they challenged its abuses, not its uses. Jesus' payment of the temple tax and his refusal to forbid the Roman tax are in point.

"We believe that in the Cross is revealed God's way of dealing with wrongdoers." And the Cross is effective in touching the conscience precisely when the impenitent are led by the inflexible conditions of the moral life to understand it. God presses men by his law and invites them by his love. The love of his father waited upon the prodigal son, and the son was turned back to him by his experiment in wilfulness in a world cruel to wilfulness.

"And that to this way all Christians are called." Let us not seem

to lighten the obligations of Christians here nor to obscure the spiritual power available. But if we have found it oversimple to say that the Cross is our Father's way of dealing with wrongdoers, is it not probable that it will be oversimple to say it of us who are his sons? In his providential dealing with his creatures who shall one day be manifested as the sons of God, but who now share the bondage and travail of the creation, God declares himself in both love and judgment. As Paul says in one and the same breath (Rom. 1:17, 18), there is a revelation of God's righteousness *(i.e.,* in the Cross) as well as of his "wrath," an archaic term even for Paul which C. H. Dodd has shown us again means the reaction of God's holiness to man's sin. It is true that unreflective Christians seek to justify their oversimple ethic by discarding Paul, but they find that they have also to ignore the austere elements in Jesus' teaching. Our point, however, is that if the Father in his providential dealing by no means restricts himself to the sole appeal of suffering love, the corollary is clear as regards the sons created in his image. In that sphere of his creation entrusted to them as free and responsible stewards, there will be a place for both love and judgment. His seemingly impersonal cosmic and moral order will have its counterpart among us in social law and social sanctions. "But who are we to appoint ourselves the agents of God's judgment!" With this cry of horror, the idealist shrinks back into a large measure of irresponsibility. But because Christians may be tempted to act with too much confidence as God's bailiffs is no reason why they should not with due self-examination assume the responsibilities of civic and social control.

"We believe that war, which attempts to overcome evil with more evil, is a denial of the way of the Cross." This leads into a larger field but for the present purpose the following comments are pertinent. 1. Coercive action, as we have seen, need not pretend to overcome evil but only to limit it. 2. It is true that coercive action is not the way of the Cross, but it is not necessarily a denial of it, any more than God's providential government of the world is a denial of his revelation on the Cross, or than Jesus' exercise of moral authority in the cleansing of the temple was a denial of his calling to the way of the Cross. 3. Whether what we have now said about coercive action applies to war or not raises entirely new questions. But it is illogical to admit the propriety for Christians of social sanctions and social control in the smaller community and to exclude it on principle from the larger one. Our decisions here will properly rest on a multitude of individual judgments with regard to a particular war, but this is the only area in which Christians should differ. The fact that social constraints in the international sphere are tinged with inferior motives does not in itself dis-

tinguish them from such constraints in the smaller community. In sustaining the fabric of social order we have to work with what we have, and that means directing the varying impulses of men, disinterested or interested, towards the most constructive ends attainable.

"We believe that the Church is called to the way of the Cross." Nothing can be truer than this. The *body* of Christ is the extension of his life in history, and as such expects and accepts the cost of testifying in the "world." In a sense, indeed, the principle of the Cross is also manifest through the whole range of secular life, in the dying soldier, in Edith Cavell, in the neglected artist, in the scorned scientist or inventor, in the countless unknown instances where the strong bear the burdens of the weak: many are the forms of social atonement. Christians should recognize that if they assume a more absolute form of social atonement, they are laying a larger share of such common and civic burdens on the shoulders of those who sustain the fabric of the world.

We agree, we say, with the statement: "The Church is called to the way of the Cross." Does this mean that the Church necessarily condemns the corporate political aspects of human life, its sociolegal authorities, and refuses consent to their appropriate methods? Or does it mean that individual Christians are not citizens and have no responsibility except that of evangelical testimony? There is a great deal of unreality here. One has the impression often that the extreme positions enunciated are but a desperate gesture to cover the ineffectualness in real situations and to drown out an inner disquiet. But apart from the question of the Christian citizen's social responsibilities, he is indeed called to the way of the Cross. But *where* and *when*? The Cross always has its *kairos,* its ripe and timely hour, when the issues of the gospel converge on a man and a situation. It should not be avoided, but neither should it be forced. Whether Christian discipleship today rightly discerns an occasion for the Cross in the war issue today, that is, in opposition to the decision of our society to secure a necessary minimum of social control, is very much a matter of sagacious political and social judgment. The Christian is called to the way of the Cross, but the question is: Which evils in the "world" today furnish the occasion?

In the pacifist leaflet the axioms of which we are discussing it is claimed that the position taken "does not emerge out of any doctrinaire opinion that force is always wrong." That is the only point in the statement at which a distinction is raised as between, say, police action and war. It is curious that the sponsors do not deal more fully with this distinction, because their axioms and their statement really imply that Christians must confine themselves to the way of the Cross in all

circumstances. This has been called "absolute pacifism." This statement really espouses it, but at one point inconsistently disavows it. It is this basic inconsistency, covering a real confusion, which explains the more recent unsettlement of pacifists or repudiation of their one-time stand. If they disavow force in the larger areas of class conflict or international life, plausible Christian reasons are at hand for doing so, but such reasons will differ from those offered, as here, for absolute pacifism. This paper does not raise the question of the relation of the Christian to the present war. It only insists that the issue of war is not a different issue from the issue of disorder in the smaller community, though it is a more complex one.

These statements which we have cited represent the basic axioms of the most persuasive type of Christian pacifism. The considerations which we have raised are cumulative and point to the conclusion that it rises out of assumptions that lack biblical support or that apply New Testament insights beyond their relevant application. It is a grave matter that zeal for a costly Christian witness should have deprived us today of a strong consensus in stating the principles of Christian social action. It is this fact that has much to do with the present enervation of our democratic leadership.

From Off the Campus and On

People may differ as to the wisdom of attempting to remove ancient denominational landmarks and create *de facto* a universal and undenominational Christian church; all will agree that a genuine understanding and appreciation of the contributions made through the years by the different groups within the Christian fellowship are highly desirable. In the present article Dr. Dauerty makes a definite contribution in this direction. He holds degrees from Lafayette, Princeton University, Princeton Theological Seminary, and the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. We welcome to our pages this gifted preacher and eminent liturgical scholar.

Professor Brown is internationally recognized as a truly great Indologist. His contacts with Indian life and thought have been many and profound. Since 1926 he has been head of the department of Sanscrit at the University of Pennsylvania. For many years editor of the Journal of the *American Oriental Society*, he is now president of that society. His essay, "Springtime Legends in India," is especially timely now that the distance to that far-off eastern land seems daily to be rapidly diminishing.

Dr. McNutt needs no introduction to readers of the Crozer Quarterly. For many years he has been head of the department of practical theology at Crozer. His most recent book, *Worship in the Churches,* was reviewed in our last issue. In this present article he concerns himself with a problem too often dodged, and he says some things in words of one syllable that need to be said.

We welcome again to the Crozer Quarterly the Reverend Thomas Saunders, pastor of a rural church in Manitoba. Readers of the Quarterly will recall with appreciation his earlier article, "The Ethic of Jesus and the Gospel of the Church" (October, 1940). Mr. Saunders was born in Dunfermline, Scotland, but educated in Canada. He graduated in arts from the University of Manitoba, in divinity from United College, Winnipeg.

Our readers will hail with interest the article, "Cadmus and the Greek Alphabet." It is to be hoped that many of them will be brought to a fresh repentance as they ponder anew that without Greek they cannot know their ABC's. Dr. Bates joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in 1895, where he remained until his recent retirement. His training at Harvard resulted in the orthodox sequence of degrees—A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. His books and articles on classical subjects have

been many and important. Since 1902 he has been a member of the Managing Committee of the School of Classical Studies in Athens.

Professor Wilder's article, written before the United States entered the war, is particularly significant. His frank discussion and appraisal of the ticklish subject of pacifism will be read with appreciation. Dr. Wilder is professor of New Testament interpretation at Andover Newton Theological School, and is known to a wide circle of readers as one of the "three Wilders."

The appreciative words of our readers as to the value they continue to find in the section of the CROZER QUARTERLY devoted to new books encourage the editor to publish in this issue an even longer list than usual. Thirty-four books, many of which are of lasting value, are surveyed by experts. We welcome to our pages reviews by ten scholars "from off the campus" in addition to those written by members of the Crozer faculty. Dr. Abrams (Crozer, '21) is a member of the department of sociology of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Mitchell Bronk was, after many years in the pastorate, on the editorial staff of The American Baptist Publication Society until his recent retirement. Professor Ferré, of the department of theology at Andover Newton, has frequently contributed reviews for our pages. Dr. Igler, a graduate of Rochester, has been for many years Baptist student pastor at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Keighton has been introduced in this column so regularly that no further identification would seem necessary. Dean King, of the faculty of theology of United College, Winnipeg—a distinguished Semitist, trained by G. F. Moore and W. R. Arnold of Harvard—is particularly fitted to review Professor Torrey's most recent challenge. Our readers of some years' standing will remember the not infrequent and telling articles he has contributed to these pages. In any list of influential American theologians the name of Douglass Clyde Macintosh of Yale would appear in a prominent place. It is a pleasure to welcome again to our pages Conrad Henry Moehlman, for many years professor of church history at Colgate-Rochester, and the author of countless books and articles, many of which have been admirably calculated to prick overfilled balloons. Professor M. C. Otto, of the University of Wisconsin, has been so recently in our pages as protesting or being protested against, that little more need be said than that he has given the editor a promise to appear again in the near future. For those whose memories are very short it may be remarked that his chair at Wisconsin is philosophy and that he is properly regarded as one of the most eminent and influential exponents of what for want of better name is popularly styled *humanism*. Dr. Wilder, alphabetically the last of our reviewers, has already been introduced in an earlier paragraph.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Story of American Catholicism, by Theodore Maynard, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xv, 694, $3.50.

This brilliant study of Catholicism in relation to American life is not the work of a scientific historian. It is not a doctoral dissertation. It is a very skilfully planned mixture of propaganda and history, describing in twenty-nine chapters a convert's enthusiasm for the true faith, but also his awareness of its defects. The index omits such items as *Americanism,* President Grant's attempt to secure an amendment to the constitution of the United States against diversion of public funds to parochial schools, *Lutherans, Anglicans,* etc. More than American Catholicism is covered in the volume. For example, "the adventures of Hitler . . . are too obviously inimical to religion to do anything except strengthen Catholic German-Americans in their American allegiance" (p. 521); ". . . . I shall never be able to think of Hitler except as a mean little man whom no amount of puffing can make great" (p. 587); "there is, under Hitler, neither dissociation nor a real unity. Rather there is a determined attempt to destroy the last vestiges of true German culture" (p. 614); "the unspeakable Nazis" (p. 380). Famous American Catholics receiving special treatment include Cardinal Gibbons, John Carroll, John Gilmary Shea, John Ireland, Dr. Peter Guilday, John Hughs, and Isaac Hecker.

Non-Catholic American religious groups are not particularly favored by our author. Methodist and Baptist preachers on the frontier were rabble-rousers (p. 262). Dr. Witherspoon was the only signer of the Declaration of Independence supplied by the Presbyterians (p. 156). "The truth is that Anglicanism . . . demanded very little of a man beyond respectability . . . and practically nothing in the way of dogmatic subscription" (p. 157). Mrs. Eddy "dissolved all flesh to spirit where Brigham Young . . . had to solidify his pantheon into flesh" (p. 325). *The Story of American Catholicism* is anti-Protestant polemic.

One hardly recognizes Turner's theory of the frontier in Maynard's references to it, but it is interpreted to the advantage of Catholicism. After it is stated that the "Declaration of Independence is essentially of Lockian origin" (p. 119), and that Locke's *Two Treatises on Government* were the Bible of the Revolution, the situation is Catholicized by the reminder that Locke got it from Hooker and Hooker from Saint Thomas Aquinas, yet "we must guard against the supposition that the scholastic theory about sovereignty being resident in the people is the official doctrine of the church" (p. 121). This reminds us of a footnote on I John 5:7 in the newly published Catholic revision of the New Testament, where it is said that the passage regarding the "three heavenly witnesses is lacking in many manuscripts and thereupon: 'The Holy One reserves to itself the right to pass finally on the origin of the present reading.'" "Of all the patriots they [the Catholics] were the most distinguished" of the Revolution (p. 143). Chief Justice Taney of Dred Scott decision fame was a Catholic. Hence his decision receives a splendid apology (p. 349). The humorous tale on p. 499 concerning the failure of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* to publish an article on "Americanism" until the fourteenth volume was reached is well told. For Catholic freedom from venereal disease, see p. 536. *The Story of American Catholicism* is very definitely propaganda.

Various presidents of the United States receive attention in this volume. Thus Washington is characterized: ". . . under Washington's icy exterior lava boiled.

We hear of huge laughter, of amazing bursts of profanity, of an earth-quaking rage" (p. 180). The interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation is summarized:

> Yet only as a war measure can the Emancipation Proclamation be justified, and then doubtfully. It was—apart even from its violation of the Constitution—a monstrous injustice. There is the argument that the President, as commander-in-chief of the army in time of war, is empowered to seize enemy property for the attaining of a military objective. But the argument is, in this case, fallacious. Slaves were obviously not at all in the same category as other property, and in any event the seizing of property implies its temporary retention rather than its final confiscation. Moreover, the freeing of the slaves at a stroke of the pen might well have resulted in the massacre of the masters and the raping of their wives by their "property." To my mind this is the one blot upon Lincoln's record (p. 359).

Woodrow Wilson is alluded to as the President of the United States who did not ask three Catholics who called on him to sit down. They were Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Ireland, and Apostolic Delegate Bonzano (p. 539).

The paragraph on p. 152 concerning the American doctrine of the separation of church and state will be quoted from Maine to Texas:

> If these provisions have been a charter of freedom for the Catholic Church—as for every other religious body in the country—one thing should be frankly said. The basis decided upon has never been considered by the Catholic Church as being, absolutely considered, the best basis, though American Catholics will not wish any change so long as our society is constituted as it is. According to Catholic doctrine, however, the union of Church and State is still affirmed to be the most perfect solution, in itself. As the statement is likely to be misunderstood, it should be added that this union is thought of only in a society so predominantly Catholic as to be able to be described as Catholic *sans phrase,* one in which government and people are in full accord in the matter of religion. For only where such unity exists is it possible for ecclesiastical and secular authority to act freely, each in its own field, and to coöperate. Elsewhere there is no chance of putting the principle into operation at all. Under prevailing conditions, therefore, the church is quite content with the guarantee of sufficient freedom to exercise its functions unhampered. Things being as they are, the Church does not contemplate putting her preferred principle into execution. Before that were done a homogeneity, which would seem to have been permanently destroyed, would first have to be regained (p. 152).

The human side of American Catholic publicists, laity, and hierarchy is well done. Orestes Brownson found the Catholic Church "a bed of spikes" (p. 581). Father Coughlin is accused of "virtually identifying social justice with Jew-baiting (under the guise of attacking both Communism and the banking system) and with a form of Fascism" (p. 596). "Corrigan, who might have been moderate left to himself, was egged on by an Irishman fully as truculent as McGlynn, Bishop McQuaid of Rochester" (p. 435). "By whatever means McQuaid had to discredit Ireland" (p. 495). "But the fate of so many gifted metaphysicians is illustrated by Monsignor Fulton Sheen, whose *God and Intelligence* proved him to be an exceptionally profound philosopher. He has since been deflected from speculation to the pulpit and the radio" (p. 580). "The main difficulty here has been that wealthy Catholics can rarely be induced to bestow endowments on educational institutions. Indeed, only one of them . . . can be said to be endowed at all. This is Creighton University in Nebraska." "To sum up: the full and proper development of the American Catholic college has not yet been achieved, for it has to a considerable extent been deflected from its true purpose" (p. 480). ". . . their educational institutions even now are somewhat badly equipped and can think only of practicalities. . . . [Our people] have still to learn that the Catholic Church is the Mother of the Arts, the soul of civilization" (p. 586).

The Story of American Catholicism does not pretend to be orthodox historically speaking, but it is a very enjoyable literary masterpiece. The KKK will underscore all its inside, *inter nos* anecdotes.

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN

The Unquenchable Light, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xx, 191, $2.00.

In these William Belden Noble Lectures in Harvard University for 1940, the author of *A History of the Expansion of Christianity* has traced the fluctuations in the influence of Christianity upon the race. Perhaps, in keeping with the title of the book, it is more appropriate to say he has described the flickering of the torch which through the centuries has been called the "light of the world."

Dr. Latourette finds that the first great advance carried Christianity forward to glorious achievements in the first five centuries, after which a recession set in for 450 years. Then came the second forward surge, ending in 1350 with a downward trend to 1500. Once again Christianity was powerful for 250 years, but was weak between 1750 and 1815. The fourth advance was from that date to 1914. The latest age, 1914 to the present, is too much a part of ourselves to be evaluated and judged.

While paying highest tribute to Dr. Latourette as an historian, his four volumes in the *History of the Expansion of Christianity* being unsurpassed in accuracy and comprehensiveness, yet I find it difficult to agree wholly with his thesis in this résumé of his larger work. It is quite evident that he is often forced to strain the bonds of his premise that what was accomplished professedly in the name of Jesus was always actually due to the influence of Jesus. If one denies his influence when men have done atrocious deeds in his name, it may well be that worthy acts have been performed without any serious thought concerning him.

Moreover, one feels that the periods of advance and recession have been rather arbitrarily determined, as, for instance, the third great advance, 1500-1750 A.D., and the third major recession, 1750-1815. Either one of these characterizations in its period may be true for a certain portion of the world's population and area but not true for another.

It is also evident that Dr. Latourette's thesis has compelled him to reject to a large extent in these lectures the social approach which helps make his larger work so valuable. There is, as a matter of fact, in this study a suspicion of the concept of an essence in Christianity which has guaranteed its precise identity from one age to another. On p. xiii the question is raised: "How was it that ideas and ideals so contradictory to much in human nature and alien to all of the cultures in which they gained currency attained such wide power?" Not replying to the first part of the question, it can be said that these ideas and ideals were *not* "alien to all of the cultures" in which they gained power. Certainly many of those ideas and ideals had currency in the Greek world of thought long before the rise of Christianity.

This "supernatural" approach to Christianity is even more clearly indicated in a statement on p. 3. "It proved highly fortunate for the spread of his influence that Jesus was born in the reign of the first Roman Emperor. Had he been born a hundred years earlier . . . or had he appeared two centuries later . . . the course of Christian faith would have been much more difficult." This is a fruitless statement. In the first place, Jesus simply could not have been born either earlier or later than he was and be the Jesus of history. He is a product of his time, just as his influence on mankind in any one age is a product of that time. In the second place, the latter part of the statement, concerning a later birth of Jesus, strangely enough does not take into account the author's own emphasis on the influence of Jesus upon history.

On p. 4, "Christianity placed its stamp upon Græco-Roman culture." Certainly.

But Græco-Roman culture also placed its stamp upon Christianity, and the Christianity of 30 A.D. is therefore not the Christianity of 150 A.D.

Nevertheless one reads this book with pleasure and profit. Here is information and incentive. The staunch faith in the resilient power in the lives of men expressed in Christianity holds steady, still, the hope of a new world.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

These Shared His Power: Studies in the Days following the Resurrection of Jesus, by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xxiv, 180, $1.75.

We find in our seminary that it is worth while occasionally for the department of homiletics to call in the New Testament department, and it is a good thing once in a while for preachers to submit their sermons or books to the biblical scholars for comment. It becomes more evident that the historical critical study of the Bible is an important thing in the training of ministers. Of course homiletical license with the Bible or with sacred history, like poetic license, must be admitted. Yet the present book throws impossibilities at the head of the critic so soon and so fast that one almost concludes that they are deliberate. It is only with good-natured malice that we call attention to the following surprises, because the book is a fine book in matters that are on the whole more important than historical accuracy. Evidently Bethlehem is supposed to be on the way from Jerusalem to Capernaum. Some of the disciples and Jesus' mother travel to Bethlehem en route to Galilee and other points north; and it is all the more surprising, since several of them hope to be in Capernaum at noon on the day following the crucifixion, a distance of at least seventy-five miles—not to mention the fact that they are travelling on the Sabbath. It is further indicated that the multitudes in Jerusalem flee from the city just as the Passover meal is about to be eaten, because of the earthquake. In the story of Jacobus Aleator, we are told that the watch is posted at the tomb a day earlier than is indicated in Matthew; and we have the resurrection the following morning, that is, on the second day rather than the third. Here is unexpected support for the Seventh Day Adventists! We are told that the Apostle Thomas was born ten years after Tiberius became emperor. That would be in 24 A.D. since Tiberius began his reign in 14 A.D. Thus Thomas would have been six years old at the time of the resurrection scene in which he acclaims his Lord.

Many questionable sayings of Jesus are used and emphasized—an unquestioned privilege of the preacher—but we are all the more surprised to find that the author repudiates the passage in Isa. 6 as to God's hardening the hearts of men, a passage cited by Jesus himself according to Mark. Incidentally, one of the choicest printer's errors in years is that whereby Professor Goodspeed is included among the early evangelists of Acts 13:1, and we read: "Goodspeed, the man who was the financial angel of the first Christian communal experiment" (p. 151—referring of course to Barnabas).

As we read the passages dealing with Jesus' message and that of his disciples as they went out two by two ("Their message was peace, their method was conciliation, their manners tolerant, their meaning plain") we cannot but recall Cadbury's theme as to the perils of modernizing Jesus. There is more meaning ultimately in the life of Jesus if it is recognized for what it was, with all its strangeness, than if we import our contemporary causes into it. Similarly with Paul. Why make Saul of Tarsus a "rationalist," a philosopher, even for the sake of better attacking modern rationalists? He was a scholar and legalist, but that is quite a different matter.

We would like to discuss the interesting ventures into imaginative portraiture, partly based on tradition, that make up part of the book. It is curious how unsatisfactory have been all attempts from Renan down to Sholem Asch—indeed, from the time of the apocryphal writings—to give verisimilitude to the figures of the circle of Jesus. Historical novels or dramas about Savonarola or Thomas Becket can succeed, but hardly those that deal with Jesus or his circle. We should make exception no doubt for *A Death in the Desert* of Browning or Abercrombie's *The Sale of St. Thomas.* The trouble is we sense the discrepancy between the depth of Jesus' concern and the modern preoccupations we impose upon them. Yet some of Dr. Poteat's imaginary scenes and conversations here as in his "Centurion" are compelling. Moreover, the central emphasis of the book is effectively brought out. The power of the resurrection lay and lies in its moral energy. These six participants of the resurrection event—Peter, Mary of Magdala, and the rest—show how love can prevail in six different areas of common temptation. The application to contemporary obstacles is tellingly made.

AMOS N. WILDER

The Inner World, by John Wright Buckham, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xxvii, 292, $3.50.

The author of this book advises the reader to pause before these verses from Francis Thompson's "The Kingdom of God":

> O world invisible, we view thee,
> O world intangible, we touch thee,
> O world unknowable, we know thee,
> Inapprehensible, we clutch thee!

"For this is the real foreword," he declares, "and the epitome of the volume" (p. ix). And the reader will find that the book tries to live up to what these words imply. It offers interpretations of invisibles, intangibles, unknowables, and inapprehensibles which make them appear to be visibles, tangibles, knowables, and apprehensibles. I say "make them appear to be," rather than "make them into," because that is what I mean. There is no doubt in my mind of the honesty of the undertaking, as there is none that the whole business is a kind of verbal magic, a sort of now-you-see it, now-you-don't act, with this difference, that the actor is the one most completely taken in.

Of course, the judgment of one reader does not settle the matter. Moreover, a reader who differs radically in outlook from the author is perhaps naturally suspected of demanding the unreasonable in the way of evidence. This suspicion is, however, irrelevant in this instance. There is a deeper objection to this book than disagreement with its general conclusion. Let the position defended be what it may, the method employed throughout this book should be unacceptable to any critical reader, whether it is employed for or against his own position or any other position. It is eclecticism in pretty nearly its worst form, weaving a pattern of argument out of carefully selected strands from a great variety of writers. Learning, ingenuity, industry are combined to formulate the right definition or find the right quotation to defend Christian theism against successful attack; but attack and defense are looked upon as occurring in a universe of discourse, not in the world of practical affairs, of men's conflicting interests and struggles to survive. No effort is made to rethink religious ideas and religious living in the face of the economic, national, or racial forces which threaten every form of moral idealism, the Christian theistic form among the rest.

The profound unrealism of Mr. Buckham's approach to his problem seems evident very early in this book. Nevertheless one is grateful for the clue supplied by the footnote on p. 232. This floods the author's attitude with light. All one has to do is to read the whole book under this illumination. I quote the entire footnote:

> It will doubtless sound extremely stupid and provincial to musicians when I say that as my wife and I sit down to enjoy a half hour of music from the radio, and a composition is announced, the first question we ask is: Is the composer living or dead? If the latter, we settle down for genuine enjoyment, quite certain that the music will be beautiful, moving, vital. If, on the contrary, the composer is living, we shut off the radio and take up a book, having learned by experience that, at least for us, the music is likely to be formless, artificial and depressing. The *living composers,* for us, are those who are "dead"; the lifeless those who are "living."

Here you have an expression of musical taste which excuses itself from making any distinction between better and worse among musical compositions of living composers. That in itself is bad enough, if you pretend to appreciate music as a venture of the human spirit. But the author of this "Introduction to the philosophy of Christianity" applies his theory of music-appreciation to life in general. And that is worse. He refuses to tune in on currents of social, economic, political, moral, philosophical, even religious, aspiration and thinking if they are alive in contemporary agitation. And he does this when all the values achieved by man's civilizing effort are in gravest danger. I am therefore bound to conclude that no person who wants religion to take on new vigor in response to the new world situation will find Mr. Buckham's garnered reading, extensive as it has been, of any help whatever.

M. C. OTTO

Experience and the Christian Faith, by Howard B. Jefferson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, pp. 230, $2.00.

Professor Jefferson's book opens with a chapter on "Experimentalism *versus* Tradition" in religion. Too much is conceded in our opinion, when it is admitted, or even contended, that the philosophy of experimentalism leads logically to pragmatic humanism. From the latter point of view, it is pointed out correctly enough, the significance of the Christian religion is largely lost. But, encouraged it would seem by the increasing use contemporary theology is making of the Christian tradition, the author tells us that what he is attempting here is to "transcend the opposition between experimentalism and traditionalism in order to make them work together."

In the second chapter, entitled "Knowledge and Faith," knowledge is identified with the empirically verifiable, and as the epistemological position taken is a dualistic realism, it is of necessity conceded that from that point of view, strictly speaking, no empirical knowledge of divine reality is possible, even on the basis of religious experience. It is anticipated, however, that, on the basis of a philosophy of values, faith in God may be found to be reasonable as well as desirable. But apart from special divine revelation, Jefferson holds, we know only instrumental values; we must "retain a skepticism about the true worth of even the highest ideals which we recognize," so that, while in faith we may postulate that "there *is* a divine will," we can only define that postulated divine will "positively as the supreme value, and negatively as transcending all known or instrumental values." "Supreme value is undoubtedly a criterion of the divine," but apart from revelation we do not know what supreme value is. (How then, it may be asked, can we recognize revelation, when it comes, as divine?)

The postulated "faith in the fact of a divine will," taken in conjunction with the author's confessed natural "skepticism regarding the specific content of what God commands us to do," leads him "inevitably" to the question of special and presumably supernatural revelation. Thus and thus alone, it is suggested, may our legitimate realistic "faith *that* God exists" be supplemented with "ideas as to *what* God is, . . . derived from the Christian tradition." The particular revelation needed is to be found in Christ and his church.

But just here difficulties are encountered. The author is careful to call for distinction between the historic Jesus and "God incarnate, . . . the Christ of Christian faith." Similarly he distinguishes between the churches as seen from the "modern," "nominalistic," "individualistic," "sect-type" perspective, according to which the holiness of the church depends upon "the distinctively Christian quality of life exemplified by the members," and on the other hand the characteristically mediæval "realistic" conception of the "ideal Church universal" as "divine" and possessing a holiness which transcends the human limitations of its membership; moreover, here again he seems to depreciate the historic actuality in favor of the idealization of religious faith. But, we would ask, if the religious faith of the individual stands in need of an objective norm and objective support, how is this need to be met by a "divine," "eternal Christ," assurance of whose reality is dependent upon the Christian faith itself? Or how are the needed objective norm and support to come from a church whose "holiness" and "divineness" are, at least in so far as they are accessible to the observation of the believer, simply idealizations produced by the very religious consciousness which feels the need of the normative correction and support?

The dilemma is one which is perhaps inescapable from the point of view of a dualistic theory of religious knowledge. Appeal may be made perchance, to miraculous revelation; but if miracle be made the criterion of revelation, where shall we find the criterion of miracle? If, however, divine reality was to any extent known to the historic Jesus in and through his religious experience; if that same divine reality was observed by the earliest Christian disciples in their Master and also experienced and known by them, and by true Christians in all ages; and if, finally, the same experience and empirical knowledge of a divinely functioning reality are accessible to us today on conditions which are not beyond fulfillment, then we have in this verifying religious experience the needed objective criterion and support for our otherwise too subjective intuition and faith. It cannot be fairly charged that this testing of intuition and faith by what is discovered about reality through dependable religious experience involves a vicious circle in logical procedure, any more than such a circle is involved in ordinary scientific verification. It is only from the point of view of agnostic dualism that there arises the circle of which Dr. Jefferson complains, when he objects to "judging tradition by experience and experience by tradition."

One more polemical remark I must allow myself, this time by way of rejoinder to the author's criticism of a recent statement of mine as "a nice begging of the question." The statement referred to was to the effect that people who claim to have practiced the right religious adjustment without positive result are mistaken, since the right religious adjustment, as defined, includes as one of its essential features *persistence* in the adjustment as otherwise specified (spiritual aspiration, self-surrender to God, appropriating faith and obedient response) long enough and intensely enough to overcome all inhibition and resistance. Now I readily admit that if the statement in question be understood as intended to be the establishing

of a conclusion by deductive inference, it will be found open to criticism, as Dr. Jefferson suggests. But that is not at all what was intended. Rather was the statement meant to be a specifying of conditions of experiment and a report of experience, albeit not with any claim of mathematical exactness of quantitative result. Thus rightly understood it can no more be dismissed as a mere begging of the question than—to use what in the reviewer's memory is a familiar, as well as homely, illustration—it would be a begging of the question to inform a person that if he were to boil maple sap long enough with a fire hot enough but not too hot, he would eventually get maple syrup and, a little later, the "makings" of maple sugar.

It may seem ungracious in the reviewer to have dealt in so one-sidedly critical a way as, up to this point, I have done with what is a well-written, closely reasoned, highly stimulating, and provocative discussion of religious and philosophical problems of both current interest and abiding importance. There is no "padding," and there is not a dull page in the book. It is to be recommended either for supplementary reading for classes in the philosophy of religion or for orientation of ministers in the bearing of present-day philosophical thinking upon fundamental features of the Christian faith and experience. Many will be especially interested in the final chapter, which deals with "Theology and the Social Problem," in which, in opposition to the extreme eschatologists, it is maintained that "men as well as God have a responsibility in bringing the Kingdom to pass in the social life of the world." Much more might be said, but the prescribed limits of the present review—already exceeded, I fear—prohibit further comment. And I the more readily allow this very incomplete discussion of an excellent book to go from my hands, inasmuch as this too brief notice is by no means intended to make the reading of the book itself unnecessary, but rather, in part, to direct attention to a work which many readers of this magazine would do well to become acquainted with for themselves.

D. C. MACINTOSH

A Creed for Free Men, by William Adams Brown, New York, Scribner, 1941, pp. xiv, 277, $2.50.

In this latest product of his pen Dr. Brown addresses himself to the problem created by the world's present-day lack of a unifying faith. "A generation ago," he writes, "it took courage to raise questions about the accepted faith. Today young people are passing out of our colleges not even aware that there are questions to be raised. Then it was the task of the religious teacher to interpret the faith of religion to those who would like to be religious if they could. Today he must persuade people who have not even a bowing acquaintance with religion that religion in any form is worthy of the attention of the educated man."

The world is fighting today, in the last analysis, Dr. Brown contends, because it has no unifying social creed; "there is no common philosophy of life in terms of which peace can be made." On the one hand, the accepted spokesman of national socialism shamelessly declares that in politics a promise is only to be kept so long as it is in the interest of the nation that has made it to keep it; on the other hand, the democracies have, for the most part, in the years between the two world wars, been leaving out of their program the discipline and call to sacrifice which alone have given moral tonic to life under the totalitarian dictatorships.

In order to have a unifying faith we need not find the answer to all our theoretical questions. It seems to be the fact that the number of questions to which the scientist can give no certain answer increases rather than diminishes as

he goes on with his research. But man has a conviction that not only is there surely some meaning in the world beyond what we can see, but that "the way to find the key to the meaning of life is to trust and follow that which makes its strongest appeal to man, as inherently just, beautiful and good."

There are many powerfully motivating "loyalties that divide" mankind into hostile camps, and which make the more imperative the discovery and adoption of "the faith that unites." Conflicts arising out of loyalty to party, race, nation, or even a particular political system, such as democracy, suggest the need of the still higher loyalty to international justice and the universal well-being of humanity. "The real cause for the failure of the League of Nations was the lack of an international consciousness. . . . We need an international party." And "many as are the faults of the Church, at least this is to be said to its credit—that it has kept alive the ideal of a world-wide international organization."

"Mankind still needs the Church." After "a period of almost complete indifference to religion, . . . one of the by-products of the international crisis is the sudden discovery, in the most unexpected quarters, that mankind's supreme need is a revival of religion. Many who feel this most strongly are outside the churches." Christianity and the church at their best have fostered and propagated the democratic faith in its fundamental principles, namely, that each individual has a value which society is bound to respect, that each individual owes a duty to society, that men are imperfect and need discipline, and that they can become better, especially if they are trusted. But in spite of past achievements and the present (or should we now say recent?) widespread international idealism, the churches "are missing their distinctive opportunity," and this is not due mainly either to their disunion or to their reactionary tendencies, important as such matters are, but rather to the fact that they are not putting in the central place it deserves the faith that it is God's purpose to make the brotherhood of all humanity a reality.

In this review I have let the author speak for himself. I have no important criticism to offer. Dr. Brown is no sensation-monger or seeker after novelty, but his message in this his latest book is a very timely one and ought to be kept in mind by us all, even though, since it was written, the nation has been catapulted into war.

D. C. MACINTOSH

Documents of the Primitive Church, by Charles Cutler Torrey, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xviii, 309, $3.50.

This is a difficult book to review, for it does not treat of a single subject, as, indeed, its title suggests. The larger part of it, however, is concerned with a restatement and elaboration of Dr. Torrey's thesis with respect to the gospels and Acts which he has made familiar to the world of scholarship in his previous writings.

The first three chapters deal respectively with "The Date of Mark," "The Biblical Quotations in Matthew," and "Aramaic Gospels in the Synagogue." What Torrey is concerned to prove in these chapters is that Mark and Matthew were Nazarene Scriptures, composed in Aramaic, and produced early. He argues at length that it was Johanan ben Zakkai who laid down the dictum reported in Tosephta Yadaim 2, 13: "The gospels and the writings of the *Minim* are not sacred Scripture." The "gospels" here referred to were "the Nazarene scriptures, presumably Mark and Matthew, in their original Semitic [*i.e.,* Aramaic] dress." That this saying be accepted as of Johanan ben Zakkai is most important for Torrey's general thesis. To support his dating of Mark in the year 40, Torrey claims that Mark 13 is an integral part of the gospel. There is a difficulty on his view with

verse 14, but this he resolves by holding that Luke's reading, "When you see Jerusalem encompassed by armies," is the correct one, the author of Mark having changed this to the definite sign of Caligula because of "the evidential value" it would have for his sketch of Jesus the Messiah. Further, the Gospel of Matthew was written to supplement that of Mark. It adds discourse matter, which, while in the main the words of Jesus, were given a Messianic coloring by the author. The biblical quotations in Matthew rest for the most part upon the Hebrew Scriptures, but the author of Matthew was an Israelite prophet, and felt free to abridge and adapt what he took. Thus the divergences are explained. A better explanation would appear to many to be that the quotations are "testimony" material, put together and in use before the Gospel of Matthew took its rise; but Torrey will give little credence to this explanation.

In Chapter IV, Torrey offers his own theory of the *Western* text. The Aramaic gospels had perished early, but there was still need for a limited time—end of the first century and the beginning of the second—of Semitic gospels. To fill this need, a Jewish Christian made a new Semitic version of the Four Gospels and Acts on the basis of the current Greek. He felt free to alter and to add to the text of Acts because he had lived through the events narrated and the book was not on as high a plane as the gospels. Later someone undertook in turn a Greek translation of this interesting text. Wherever the Aramaic exactly rendered the standard Greek, the Greek was simply restored unchanged. But the Aramaic idioms of the Aramaic translation were also faithfully reproduced, and often other nouns and verbs than those in the standard Greek text were employed to render the Aramaic. Hence the long list of synonyms. It is a complicated theory, and it remains to be seen whether it will be any more generally accepted than the many others that have been proposed for the problem.

Chapter V, "The Language and Date of the Apocalypse," is a lengthy setting forth of the claim that the last book of the New Testament was written originally in Aramaic. To this study I believe scholarship will be greatly in debt to Torrey. Here again his general standpoint makes him seek an early date. He believes that the book was written in the year 68.

The last chapter of the book takes up the question of the Old Syriac gospels and their relation to the Curetonian gospels, the Diatessaron, and the Peshitta version. Here again Torrey presents the fruits of his own original studies.

This volume contains much that will be a permanent contribution to New Testament studies. Nevertheless, as I read it, I was confirmed in my belief that the time has come to call a halt to the hostilities that prevail over the Aramaic-Greek controversy. The labors of Torrey, Montgomery, Olmstead, W. R. Taylor, and other Aramaic scholars have produced some results bearing upon the New Testament that cannot be dismissed. On the other hand, the scholars of the Aramaic school must make themselves sympathetically conversant with the permanent contributions to New Testament study arrived at on the basis of the Greek. What is needed greatly is an approach to the manifest problems that fraternally pools the results and resources of both fields in the larger interest of New Testament science.

As to errors: A "2" has slipped out in the numbering of the note at the bottom of p. 42; on p. 154, line 17, "pp. cli ff." should be "pp. clvi ff."; on p. 95, "retractions" should be "retractations."

GEORGE BROCKWELL KING

This Christian Cause: Three Letters, by Karl Barth, New York, Macmillan, 1941, unpaged, $0.75.

This is one of the most amazing documents I have read for a long time—and a book editor sees some honeys! It is a compound: breadth and statesmanlike sanity of view with an impossible and weird theology, which it is no exaggeration to call a but very slightly modernized mediævalism.

Barth, a Swiss living and lecturing in a theoretically neutral Switzerland, is in a doubly difficult position. During the former war he was a pacifist. Today he is ardently and passionately in favor of the war. It is possible that under different circumstances his old arguments for pacifism might hold. In the future he may dust them off and champion them again. But distinctly not now. Today Christians must not adopt the silence of pacifism. They must speak out, and their word must give no uncertain sound, must not be "No" or "Yes and no"; the only possible answer is an unqualified "Yes."

Yet the Church (editorial disinclination to the overuse of capitals is powerless in the face of Barth) must not see in the war a *causa Dei,* must not wage nor preach a crusade against Hitler—bitterly as Barth despises him and insists that he is to be resisted to the death, as the manifestation of the evil demons from the pit, loosed by God for a season—for Christ who died on the cross died for Hitler too, and, even more, for all those who voluntarily or involuntarily serve under his banner. Christians will fight because they are human and must defend themselves. This war is a large-scale police measure. But they are not "God's warriors," and are not fighting for God, for this war is not God's battle. *That* battle was won on Calvary. They are not defending (nor extending) the kingdom of God. That will come of itself, without our efforts, when God wants it to come. They are fighting a war which was, to be sure, made *possible* by the mistakes of the years after 1919, but which was not made *necessary* by them. (It is of interest to note that this typically Barthian distinction, with its emphasis that the threat to the world seen in Hitler and his minions is ten times more deadly than is the sum total of the mistakes at Versailles, comes in the last of these three letters. In the first letter there was a bit more outspoken readiness to call both France and England to a recognition of their sins and responsibilities. Much had happened between the end of 1939 and the spring of 1941.) Actually the war is to test our "faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ," and above all, to test our obedience to that faith. Thus Hitler and his crew are to be seen as spurred on by evil spirits, allowed their freedom for a time seemingly to make this test possible.

We may lose. The "miracles of antichrist" may triumph—this gloomy possibility is seen in the first letter but looms more threateningly in the last one—but we must go on fighting. To be sure, we must submit to God's will even if the forces of antichrist triumph; we must be humble to God. Nonetheless we must still go on fighting, for we must not be humble to Hitler or to "facts and circumstances." It is idle for British Christians to urge as the reason for resisting Hitler "western civilization," "liberty of conscience," "freedom of knowledge," "the infinite value of human personality," "brotherhood of man," or "social justice." These are all well enough. The one real object, however, must be seen to be the "Resurrection of Jesus Christ." This is Christian. The others are not, for a Hindu, a Buddhist, or an atheist could hold them. Thus Barth reëmphasizes again that fuzzy thinking which has resulted in *Christian* theology, *Christian* ethics, *Christian* biology, and *Christian* dishwashing.

But in sharp contradistinction to this deadly mediæval theology with its hopeless determinism, its demons, Satan, and apocalyptic trimmings, its curious view of the function of the State (strangely reminiscent of Paul's least defensible notion of the place of the Jewish law), is revealed a generous and understanding spirit, an outlook broad and wide enough to embrace all of different faiths, convictions, and races. It *is* an amazing document.

The little volume contains three letters: two to French Protestants, written in December 1939 and October 1940; one to Great Britain, written in April 1941. The same general point of view is to be seen; nonetheless certain quiet changes of emphasis evidence the amount of water that had flowed under the bridge in the interim. All three letters have been published separately. This volume is the American "edition" of the English *A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland.* Dr. Mackay of Princeton has written an appreciative and illumining introduction to the American edition.

To some, Barth is "the best known and most influential of living Christian thinkers"; to others, he is a strange and misguided theologian whose views are not only wrong but wrong-headed. Be that as it may; all, regardless of their opinions (or lack of opinions) upon this point, will find in these letters much to ponder, and may well find that their own thinking on some points at least has been clarified.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Religion and the World of Tomorrow, by Walter W. VanKirk, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. vii, 150, $1.50.

A vigorous deliverance, well-written and based first of all on the conviction that in spite of furious demonic forces at work at this moment and the loud counsels of despair, there will surely be a world of tomorrow. Dictators have laughed at God but eventually they slipped into pits they dug for their victims. However, the book is no mere proclamation that "God's in His heaven—All's right with the world!"

Dr. VanKirk reviews frankly some of the grave mistakes that were made by the victors in the first world war, including America's failure to grasp an unprecedented opportunity to help humanity to a higher path. He is convinced that the victorious nations might have forestalled developments which gave Hitler and other dictators opportunity to come to power. He lists many of Hitler's crimes, which he recognizes as most atrocious, but he points also to the definite failures on the part of the democracies to relieve a situation which developed into armed conflict. Especially does he indict the statesmen of the more powerful nations who did not rise above political considerations. And it is indeed a dismal picture of today's suffering world which he paints for us. This reviewer has found no writer who in a small portion of his book paints a more distressing picture of the world's agony.

Yet Dr. VanKirk does not despair. He finds that some of the organized religious forces of the world have been more alert in recent years than ever before to call attention to those conditions in which wars are rooted and to suggest a remedy. He cites event after event to support his statement. But he recognizes that the disunity even in the Protestant forces makes very weak the influence of the churches in any call for unity of altruistic purpose on the part of the nations.

It is a time for repentance. The churches must call attention to the paganism which grips our modern life and show that, if we persist in it, the conclusion of a

second world war will merely mark the beginning of preparation for another and even more terrible conflict. Equality of opportunity so far as possible must be provided for all people if justice is to prevail, and the religious forces must create a supporting public opinion for such a peace as will be just and durable. But successful efforts in that direction will require a larger measure of sacrifice on the part of privileged nations than even participation in a world war has demanded. The churches should be leading the people to prepare for the sacrifices that will be required in the post-war period.

In order to establish a just and durable peace there must be spiritual foundations for the world of tomorrow. The avoidance of a spirit of vengeance is absolutely necessary, but that will require a tremendous wave of brotherhood throughout the earth, which is impossible unless the hearts of men are renewed. The renewal of life and the creation of a sacrificial spirit must be the great objective of the religious forces.

It is impossible in a brief review to indicate fairly the unusual value of this book, which is all the more valuable because it is so frank and so largely factual in its contents. It is not just an ordinary preachment. As secretary of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill of the Federal Council of Churches, Dr. VanKirk is especially well-qualified to speak on those religious conditions which will affect the world of tomorrow.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by E. Parl Welch, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xxiv, 337, $3.25.

There are tides of interest in scholarly circles. Right now American philosophers are giving considerable attention to phenomenology. This is indicated by the vigor of a new philosophical journal devoted to phenomenological research, the space given to the topic in the new philosophical dictionary, and by the publications dealing with the subject. This book, therefore, is timely. It also adds interest to a growing controversy about what Husserl really meant by phenomenology and what aspects of it he considered of greatest importance. There is just time enough after the death of the master in 1938 for his disciples to try to interpret him not a little in the light of their own basic interest and perspective. The battle is on, and already Dorion Cairns has fired his heaviest guns, loaded more, it seems, with accusations than with explanation, at Welch's rendering of Husserl's philosophy.

As with Kant, as with Whitehead, so with Husserl. Certain philosophers practically stop with Kant's first *Critique,* considering that his real contribution, while others see in it mostly an important prelude to his more weighty achievements. Some Whiteheadian scholars, similarly, consider his philosophy after the *Principles of Natural Knowledge* to be dangerously mixed with emotionalism and speculation, while others consider his subsequent works by far his most adequate metaphysics. Already Husserl's interpreters begin to clash on the same basic issue. Is phenomenology primarily a method of analyzing experience that ends in a subjective-perspectived descriptionism, whether the essences be real or ideal, an "insightful ideation" of logical forms and natural essences that banishes older epistemologies, precludes ontological metaphysics, prohibits inferential systemizations based on coherence or correspondence, and declares empirically inadequate the reduction of philosophic content to naturalistic psychology; or is phenomenology primarily a universal science of the forms of experience which are self-evident

by intuition, a personalism with a substantial pure Ego and a real world of mind and spirit, a richer empiricism that has broken with sensationalism and all narrow scientism, making room for even the direct experience of the Divine? Husserl's kind of empiricism will doubtless be increasingly torn between the two traditionally divergent Platonic and Aristotelian tendencies on the part of the interpreters. Welch considers Husserl's phenomenology to be primarily a rich intuitionism which gives the lie to a narrow identification of empiricism with sensationalism, and to its being merely a "descriptive doctrine of essences of pure experience" which is in its deepest intent the same as those philosophies which reduce knowledge to material fact plus logical form. Phenomenology to Welch is a greatly enriched, realistic empiricism which makes room for the immediate revelation of not only eternal forms but moral and spiritual Being as the most certain and essential aspect of any adequate analysis of experience.

Husserl's explicit teachings contain strictures, however, that seem to thwart the turning of his phenomenology into a methodology acceptable to vital religion. Yet it has influenced and doubtless will influence many religious thinkers. Phenomenology and religion are at least natural allies in that both seek to break through a paralyzing scientism.

Welch writes lucidly and importantly. His chapter summaries are exemplary. His bibliography is remarkably complete. No one can read this book painstakingly without being immensely stimulated and intellectually enriched.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, by Raymond Bernard Blakney, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xxviii, 333, $3.00.

The mediæval centuries knew no more colorful mystical figure than Meister Eckhart. Born in Germany in 1260, he was destined to make several contributions of note to the life of his people before he died in 1328. For one thing, he brought fresh form and vitality to the German language, making it a "vehicle for ideas that hitherto had been considered expressible only in Latin." Through this ministry he made a second important contribution, namely, the introduction for the first time into the mediæval German dialects of a discussion of the ultimate things of life and death.

Indeed, it may be said that the sole passion of this scholar, who received his title of "Master" from a degree earned at the University of Paris, was to probe into the nature of that true life which exists in God and man. He may be described as a profound, speculative searcher who pondered the deep things in man and God. Truly, his work represents the fruitage of deep calling unto deep. This explains why he is not always easily understood. In truth, to the non-mystical reader he is frequently incomprehensible.

The present translation contains four important works by Meister Eckhart, as well as twenty-eight sermons, a number of fragments and legends, and a statement of his defense addressed to those who accused him of heresy. The four works are *Meister Eckhart's Talks of Instruction, The Book of Divine Comfort, The Aristocrat,* and *About Disinterest.* The sermons, most of which are not directly from the hand of Eckhart, but from the pens of those who made notes of his sermons, are less authoritative than the works. The *Defense* is valuable as a check on the sermons, giving us important clues to Eckhart's true positions as recorded within his sermons and other works. The total volume will be prized by all students of Eckhart and mediæval mysticism generally.

Perhaps the most significant impression which comes to one reading through

these various works and sermons lies in Eckhart's theory of the uncreated agent in the soul of man. By an agent he means an active quality or capacity which produces a certain effect. It is this uncreated, divine agent in the soul which makes man of "the genus and species of God." Eckhart argues that there must be such an agent, which must be like God, or else the soul would be an impossibility. He also calls this agent the spark, the core, the light, and the "little castle" in the soul. Untouched by time and flesh, this agent proceeds out of the Spirit, remains forever completely in the Spirit, and, hence, is entirely spiritual. In this agent "God blossoms and is verdant . . . with all the Godhead and spirit of God and there he begets his only begotten Son as truly as if it were in himself" (Sermon 24). This can only mean that the inner core of the soul is God himself, "God and all the Godhead" (Sermon 25). Hence Eckhart conceives the soul and God to be so closely related to each other that no distinction is possible between them. He thus arrives at the monistic position of mysticism which ever grows out of the conviction that there is an essential unity between God and the soul.

While the positions of Meister Eckhart will find little hospitality in certain quarters, and while many of them will seem extreme even to those possessing a sympathy for practical, religious mysticism, they deserve careful consideration by all who want to understand the views to which speculative mysticism leads.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Prayer, by George A. Buttrick, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, pp. 333, $2.75.

It is commonplace to say that a book is timely; but this one certainly is. If any kind of book is to be published just now, it should be a book on prayer. There are today great multitudes of people everywhere who see no "way out"—of their own and the world's desperate straits—except the way of prayer. We are all praying, even those of us who didn't before—or not much. But what do we know about prayer? Is it something real enough to have values for a realistic age? Does it stand the pragmatic test—work? Yes, there was need, tremendous need, of a good book on prayer; a treatment of it that would appeal to 1942 believers and non-believers alike. It seems to me that Dr. Buttrick here supplies us with that desideratum. He is, of course, the distinguished pastor of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York, and a former president of the Federal Council.

It is a remarkably comprehensive book. This may be in part due to the fact that it is a blending of three separate courses of lectures given by the author at, respectively, Emory University, the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, and Vanderbilt University. Yet he advises that it is not a *reprise* of these lectures, for the book had been previously in mind. Prayer is considered from every aspect and angle, and account is taken of practically everything that has been said for or against it. The doubts, and even the sneers, of the skeptic are not caustically pushed aside; the demurs of science and materialism are squarely looked at, and there is charity for the extravagant faith that literally would "remove mountains" by prayer. It is characteristic of Buttrick's treatment that he quotes the incident where Huckleberry Finn loses faith in praying because the fishline he prayed for was vouchsafed, but without the indispensable fishhooks!

The author's own faith in prayer is sane, strong, and unwavering, but not paraded. He is never dogmatic about it. He confesses that after all is said prayer remains a problem and mystery; so, many of his readers will be disappointed at his inconclusiveness. The style is brilliant, and hence it is fascinating reading. On every page there are cunningly devised sentences: "Prayer cancels our homesick-

ness." Prayer "is man's pitiable finitude knocking in entreaty at the door of Infinite Resource." The "field of second-rate religion is strewn with the corpses of abstract nouns." Indeed, sometimes you have the feeling that the language is rather too smart for such a holy subject as prayer. But the discussions come home to us. It is not an otherworldly, but a practical book—and contemporaneous. Perhaps the most notable passages are those that treat of "corporate prayer," prayer as it relates us in God to others and society at large.

The book is full of quotations, from here, there, and everywhere, that are apt and illuminating. The bibliography is a usable one, while the index might well be a model—and suggestion—to other authors and publishers. The book is in four parts: "Jesus and Prayer," "Prayer and the World," "Prayer and Personality," "A Way of Prayer."

MITCHELL BRONK

The Living Past, by Cyrus H. Gordon, New York, John Day, 1941, pp. 232, $2.50.

That Dr. Gordon has a wide range of accurate Semitic scholarship and a high sense of responsibility for first quality work is attested by his many articles in scientific journals. His fear that catering to a wider public might interfere with the forthright interpretation of facts has hitherto prevented him from attempting this type of work. Public acclaim and the returns therefrom are indeed subtle temptations to which not a few promising students have succumbed. But the father of the author is right when he suggests that the scholar has a responsibility "to write a popular book so that plain human beings . . . may know what you are talking about" (p. 7). The obedient son has amply met the appeal of the parent, and has in no way side-stepped the demands of the finest scholarship. From the expert archæologist this book wins praise for its interpretation of scientific fact as well as for accuracy. The amateur is fascinated by the constant illumination of old themes and the opening up of quite new vistas of interest. To the layman who is at all interested in human affairs, ancient or modern, it opens a door to the easy understanding of the customs and history of the peoples of the Near East. Here one learns how much we owe those ancient peoples, how different, and yet how similar, these two cultures.

This volume is a very human document; on every page we see the author at work with the source material: sometimes the native Arab, more frequently the debris of ancient civilization. All the material is drawn from five years (1931-1935) of archæological work in Palestine, Transjordania, Mesopotamia, and Ras Shamra. Here we learn how the author succeeded in enabling the natives to overcome the fear of ghosts; how he obtained the greatest possible amount of work out of them; how he inadvertently changed the name of a Bedouin tribe; how he dismissed incompetent workers, detected faked antiquities; how he explained diseases of the eye, as the work of jinns rather than germs, to the satisfaction of the sufferers; how the workmen made inroads into his reserves of castor oil; and how he met this and many other problems.

In the early chapters of the book we have an admirable, though informal, glimpse into the methods of field work in archæology. Here there is no haphazard activity controlled only by the prejudice of the excavator. All is well ordered and thoroughly tested. The story of uncovering buried cities is graphic. The necessity of studying each stratum, recording and preserving all accurately, even photographically, is imperative. All cultural remains, inscriptions, seals, inscribed potsherds, even common pottery, under competent scholarship contribute to the

reading of the story of the ancient past. These properly interpreted make it the living past.

Some of the important conclusions that have been presented may be mentioned. Evidence is now conclusive that in Transjordania sedentary populations occupied a number of important cities during the following periods: from the twenty-third to the nineteenth century B.C., from the twelfth to the seventh century B.C., and again from the third century B.C. to the fifth century of our era. During the intervening centuries the cities were all destroyed and the Bedouin roamed at will over the ruins. Hence the Israelites must have passed this way during the thirteenth century if the narratives of their journey are taken at face value (p. 37).

The chapter on glyptic art, in which thirty-two cylinder seals, dating from the second half of the fourth millenium B.C. down to the seventh century, are photographed and interpreted, is important for both history and culture. It is hoped that in the not too distant future the author may be able to publish his larger work on seals. Other chapters are of no less significance. The gods and heroes of Ugarit (pp. 133-135) and the world of demons and liliths (pp. 196-217) throw light on some of the cruder features of the Scriptures, for the background is the same. No doubt Dr. Gordon is right when he suggests that the Ugarit tablets are the most important addition to ancient literature since the decipherment of Egyptian hieroglyphics (p. 155). Indeed, to the student of Old Testament religion the value of these tablets seems to be beyond anything that came from Egypt. Here is a good introduction to them as well as to much other material.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Francis of Assisi: Apostle of Poverty, by Ray C. Petry, Durham, Duke University Press, 1941, pp. ix, 199, $3.00.

St. Francis of Assisi is a figure too little understood and consequently too glibly used as an example of one who followed Jesus implicitly. The average person knows that he was the apostle of renunciation, but further than that knows practically nothing of his reason for poverty and its implications and purposes. Mr. Petry has written a most thorough and illuminating study of St. Francis, adhering to his announced intent of letting "Francis live and speak for himself in the atmosphere and within the form of thought and language suitable to his world" (p. vii). The result is a book in which there is a staggering succession of merely simple, declarative sentences with confirming footnotes. There are 539 footnotes on 177 pages—the more remarkable when one considers that a single note may include a dozen or more references and may occupy a quarter page.

Francis, as the result of a personal conversion experience to renunciation, gathered together a group that was later to be recognized as an *order.* He accepted completely the traditional story of Jesus and his absolute renunciation of possessions, home, family, friends, and position. He intended no attack upon any existing institution, no social reform, no new social order, no code of conduct, merely the incarnation for himself and a few chosen persons of the life of Jesus. The purpose of such a renunciation was responsiveness to every human need in Christ's name. The attending virtues were simplicity, humility, and obedience.

His renunciation was complete. The only things he considered worth having were those that the heart alone could possess, that money could not buy, and that private possession could not encompass. Such an idea of poverty he carried into the fields of the rich and the poor, not as an economic adjustment, for which he had

neither ability nor inclination, but merely to show that happiness could be found properly only beyond those experiences that result from possession.

The uncritical acceptance of the Bible as the source book for his authority gave him a new comprehension of its mysteries known only to others in parables. Through the liturgical church a dramatic visualization of the Bible was made possible and experiential. His famous attitude toward natural objects came from his relation of them to biblical passages in which they were used poetically, passages that Francis applied to Jesus.

Francis accepted enthusiastically the idea of the approaching end of the age, believing that he was responsible for following Christ's poverty in order that he might more effectively herald the coming kingdom with the urgency of crisis. He was apocalyptic in message and eschatological in thought. What he did here and now would not determine God's kingdom—that was God's choice and power—but its demands determined the manner in which Francis should bless his age. Sacrificial ministry proclaimed the way of salvation for men.

In all things he was loyal to the Roman Church, to which he gave complete obedience and sanction; the church and the pope returned the compliment by approving him and his order. His early dreams of knightly glory were realized in the transmuted form of service to religion and poverty, satisfying his romantic, chivalrous, and adventurous spirit. As a mystic he sought divine union through harsh and even cruel tortures of his body, keeping it physically inferior to the spirit.

Such a life was not intended to be for all men, but only for the very few. Mounting numbers and diverse interpretations of poverty required the organizing power and administrative wisdom of the church. Strict poverty could not advance the church's program. His ideal was its own defeat, and its subsequent failure was due neither to church deceit nor to Francis' disloyalty, but to the consequence of subjecting fragile idealism to daily realities. He felt he was the harbinger of a society yet to come—he attempted to live now the ideals then to be realized.

One emerges from a study of Francis' apostolate with certain definite convictions as to its limitation and failure. With all of his charm and unselfishness, Francis must, nonetheless, be appreciated as a man of passionate impulses, sustained, often illogical conclusions, and simple, unsophisticated mentality. The same ideal which gave him charm and magnetism also filled him with fanciful notions and fatuous obsessions. . . . If it is unjust to evaluate his life and thought according to modern standards of judgment, it is likewise shallow to invest him with a halo of perfection (p. 164).

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Victorian Prelude, by Maurice J. Quinlan, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 301, $3.00.

Many volumes have been published about the Victorian era, but this is the first to explain the causes of its rise and development. The subtitle, "A History of English Manners," is exact. Mr. Quinlan has written a superb and engaging study of the pre-Victorian age in England.

The eighteenth century was profligate in morals and extravagant in manners—sensual, profane, and debauched. The Industrial Revolution produced social ills that the majority of people readily attributed to the degraded and vicious nature of the lower strata of society. The French Revolution threatened a similar democratic liberalism in England and a possible atheistic society, even to the extent

of creating a mythical conspiracy to overthrow all organized religions and governments throughout the world.

Within the fifty years from 1780 to 1830—the "Victorian prelude"—drastic changes had occurred, changes that were to develop into Victorianism with its deeply rooted, popular convictions. Morals were improved, manners were restrained, religion was accepted. What produced these changes?

It began with a conservative reaction to the menace of the French Revolution's possible effect upon England. John Wesley and his zeal for the personal salvation of the individual soul grew into an evangelical movement that disturbed the church into a counter-reformation within itself, which only increased the susceptibility of English people to reform measures. Sunday schools were organized, not as we have usually supposed to teach religion, but to teach children to read. For fifty years this continued their sole function. Here was one of the most profound influences upon the people, for it created a literate society. Upon this newly created society propagandist literature was poured, literature calculated to direct men into the proper ways of conduct and thought. Followed by a monitorial system of education, it could not help being effective in producing a controlled people. Proud of their new talent, they eagerly read the pamphlets and tracts and stories that came from the presses. Writers like Hannah More, Mrs. Trimmer, and Mary Sherwood—propagandists all—were the "best sellers" of the day, while Scott, Keats, Coleridge, and Wordsworth coughed in their dry dust.

Societies for the Reformation of Manners, for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, for Bettering the Condition and Increasing the Comforts of the Poor, for Promoting the Observance of the Sabbath, for the Suppression of Vice, for the Distribution of Religious Tracts—to mention a few by name—played a very important part during this period of controlled manners and morals.

One of the characteristics of such an age is always censorship. It thrived during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the evangelical-mindedness of the common people, with dozens of writers constantly issuing warnings against the novel and the theatre, and because of the impressionable groups of new readers who were easily convinced. The expurgators could consider themselves liberals or at least middle-of-the-roaders. What a job these guardians of the public morals really did! Deletion was not enough; they added their own so-proper lines.

The mind of the expurgator or censor is always difficult to understand unless one is also zealous for souls as timid as his own. One might stretch a point and allow mild changes in Shakespeare, but why revise and correct *Robinson Crusoe* on the ground that the story might have the dangerous effect of inspiring in young readers a taste for adventure? Why omit whole chapters from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (among them the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters) because "the history of the church is not intended to form a part of this work"? Perhaps we should be lenient in view of the fact that one of these Cerberean gentlemen, Thomas Bowdler, bequeathed to us a delightful verbal epithet.

By all means read this book. It is a challenging study in social and religious developments. The author, writing more in terms of trends and subjects than in strict periods and lives, has illuminated an age of influence less interesting than the age it produced only to those who either know nothing about it or who prefer to attend a drama rather than write or produce one. The volume is indispensable to the student of religion. It is more than likely that we, too, are in a pre-something-or-other age!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Conquest of Death, by F. Townley Lord, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, pp. 185, $1.50.

This is an excellent up-to-date summary of the traditional apologetic for personal immortality. Important critical contributions to the discussion have been frankly recognized. Hume finally disposed of the idea that in man there was a spiritual entity quite apart from the body. The behaviorist's emphasis on physiology cannot be entirely neglected. The findings of the Society for Psychical Research and similar studies are neither unambiguous nor final. Nor has the long array of philosophic argument fully convincing power. Hence the author is forced to fall back on the New Testament statements, and on the practical values derived from the doctrine. But even here he is not dogmatic.

The conclusions are convincing chiefly to those who are convinced already. It is true that immortality is an all but universal belief, but antiquity may indicate nothing more than that it is a vestigial remnant. Nor are the questions raised by the practical values of the doctrine any less serious. In world religions it has often been associated with what are usually considered the greatest of crimes. In Mohammedanism it can scarcely be associated with ethical values. In the Orthodox Greek, and Latin churches not infrequently is it the fulcrum for priestly power and for the increase of the revenues of the church. In large areas of Protestantism it undermines all ethical judgments and negates all social responsibilities. In general, it seems to be in close alliance with mediæval doctrines of the atonement, and seeks to solve life's chief issues by tabling them until after the resurrection. Certainly, in not a few cases it acts as an anæsthetic.

On the other hand, it is doubtful if it played any important part in the moral equipment of the world's heroes. The great prophets never mention it. Job faced life unafraid though his conviction was that beyond the grave there were no moral distinctions, no great joys or sorrows. Wilberforce and his kin had too much to do with the here and now even to think about the celestial city with the golden streets. The joy of the martyrs in their suffering is not peculiar to the Christian faith, nor is it necessarily connected with essential values. It may be self-induced. One wonders, then, if so much is to be attributed to the doctrine of the Blessed Hope as the author would have us think. At least it must be admitted that it is a belief which in not a few cases has been abused.

I. G. MATTHEWS

What We Can Believe, by Randolph Crump Miller, New York, Scribner, 1941, pp. xiv, 240, $2.00.

The author is one of the younger writers in the field of theology who is winning increasing recognition as an able exponent of the Christian faith. The title of the book reveals his awareness of the present situation in the religious world and expresses well his purpose in writing, which he declares to be "to indicate *the direction of belief and action that modern Christians should take.*"

In carrying out this purpose he frankly faces such timely questions as "Is the Bible out of date?" "Who is God?" "Who was Jesus?" "Why believe in the Church?" "Does prayer work?" "Where is the kingdom?" His answers to these questions are straightforward and constructive, and therefore of value to those who are seeking light on these important matters.

The method here employed in testing religious truth is the one known as "empiricism," which is based upon observation, experimentation, and inference. The writer uses it quite consistently but is careful not to carry the process beyond cer-

tain limits, prescribed, perhaps unconsciously, by his own intellectual and religious training. For example: while boldly accepting the results of biblical criticism, in the light of which, he says, "we no longer think of the Bible as the infallible Word of God," when he comes to consider the historic creeds he falls back on the traditional idea that they "are valid *in so far as they can be proved by Scripture.*"

In his discussion of Christology he rejects the formula of Chalcedon, although admitting that it "states the pattern of orthodoxy." In his opinion "it is doubtful if he (Jesus) claimed to be the messiah, much less to be God." As a more reasonable basis for Christology he offers the "wholly human" Jesus, unique as *"the* son of God," possessing important "insights into the nature of God," and serving as the dwelling place of the Logos, thus becoming God incarnate. In view of his avowed use of the empirical method, it is interesting to note how easily he adopts the "Logos" theory as to God's connection with the human race.

The author has an attractive style, and is apt in coining striking sentences, such as the following: "Divisions in the Church are hard to heal, because the points of difference are held as matters of *revealed truth* rather than as empirical knowledge." "When we ask in Jesus' name, our petitions and intercessions must come up to his standards." Barthianism "is a projection of the fascist formula into the skies and at the same time a denial of that formula in politics."

A bibliography of nearly a hundred titles and a carefully prepared index add to the value of the book. The writer seems to have a not unreasonable assurance that he who stops to dip into his work will tarry to study it.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xi, 787, $5.00.

That social work has undergone radical changes in the last generation is one of those statements generally accepted as axiomatic. Something of the nature and extent of those changes and the more mature philosophy may be gained from a reading of the pages of this volume. Here are brought together sixty-four of the more than 150 papers which were read at the Conference of Social Work at Atlantic City June, 1941.

The stereotype of the older social worker—usually a frustrated spinster, ringing doorbells, delivering food baskets, trying to "do good" in her naïve way, and commanding the lazy and drunken husband to quit his grog, get to work, and support his poverty-stricken family—still persists in some quarters. But if she ever had her day it has long since passed. Social work has now become a profession, requiring a high degree of specialized training, skill, and experience, emotional balance, insight, and scientific objectivity.

In some parishes, at least, many hours of the minister's time are devoted to some type of social or welfare work, or community projects that require a familiarity with the broader aspects of social work itself. One of the functions of the church would seem to be to relate itself dynamically to the total welfare of the members of the community. Religion cannot operate in a vacuum. The minister who has been trained to appreciate the newer approach in this field can be of invaluable assistance both inside and outside the immediate parish. Social workers know how difficult it is to work with and through the average clergyman because, among other things, of his emotional attachment to a type of relief and philosophy long since proven to be inadequate and often detrimental to the real welfare and future of the client.

A reading of only a few of the chapters shows what tremendous progress has been made in the diagnosis and treatment of families and individuals who need help. Something of the breadth of view and the relationship of social work to other phases of life may be gathered from some of the chapter headings: "The Contribution of Social Work to Government," "The Importance of Social Services to Labor," "National Defense and the Health and Welfare Services in the United States," "Agricultural Migration," "Civil Rights in Time of Stress," "Care of Refugee Children," "Psychosomatic Knowledge in Case Work," "Diagnostic Criteria for Normal and Abnormal," "Human Values in Public Welfare Programs," "Personality and Adjustment in Older Children," "Breaking the Delinquency-Crime Chain," "Better Housing as a Health Resource," "Unemployment Compensation Legislation," "Effective Organization of Social Forces in Small Towns and Rural Communities."

In his paper on "The Philosophy of Case Work Today" Gordon Hamilton of the New York School of Social Work, declares:

> The problem of our generation is to link scientific advances, especially the social sciences, with the purposes of welfare, with economic and political as well as industrial and physical events. The evolutionary movement must be to make love instead of hostility dominant in human affairs, and to that end the science of society must be developed and strengthened. The test of a trend is whether it brings us closer to truth and, to use the old word, virtue, and the test of case work is not only its pragmatic ability to help, but its power to liberate, enlarge, and socialize the human spirit.

RAY H. ABRAMS

Biblical Hebrew for Beginners, by Ovid R. Sellers and Edwin Voigt, Chicago, Blessing Book Stores, 1941, pp. iii, 59.

In this brochure Professor Sellers has placed at the disposal of others who wish to avail themselves of the results of his experience the product of fifteen years experimentation in teaching Hebrew. Naturally the method is inductive, and moves little by little from the simple to the complex. The alphabet, consonants and vowels, pronunciation, translation and transliteration, principles of grammar, composition, and translation of Scripture move on apace, but not more rapidly than the diligent student can bear, until at the end of forty lessons he should have a fair working knowledge of Hebrew. For classroom work it is much more practical than Harper's *Hebrew Method and Manual.* It is simpler and all the required material is in one book, practically on the page for the day. It is much easier to handle than Davidson or Kautzsch. It is a boon to the teacher, as it will save endless explanation, while for the student not only is it simple but it is the acme of clarity. It looks so much like a royal road to Hebrew that one wonders if many an unsuspecting student may not be beguiled into the study of the language of the Prophets.

Naturally, where there is no final agreement among scholars, each teacher must follow his own judgment. So no serious question should be raised concerning the transliteration used, though this system is rarely found in Bible dictionaries or commentaries that are in general use in America. The reviewer, however, wonders if it might not have been of advantage if the word accents had been introduced at the very beginning, so that pronunciation and accent which are permanently wedded might have been learned together. Altogether this is the best book for beginning Hebrew that I know. It has the essentials, to be expanded as the teacher wishes, and should be of very wide service.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Into Abundance, by Soren K. Ostergaard, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1940, pp. x, 154, $1.50.

In surveying the contemporary American scene, as of 1940, Mr. Ostergaard was impressed (or depressed) by the tremendous gap between the national wealth and income on the one hand and the poverty and misery of the lower classes on the other. Only a tiny fraction of the people can be classified among those really able to enjoy the comforts of this life. Only four per cent of the American people have incomes of over $4,400 a year, and only then can have comfortable houses, nourishing food, adequate clothes, "the means to be generous," and the ability to do things and go places.

He insists that this condition of affairs can be remedied. First there must be a reëmphasis and repainting of the old signposts such as, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and "Do to others as you would have them do to you." In times of economic crisis these are as important as ever—even more so.

On the economic side he says that the New Deal, through the T.V.A., the Resettlement Administration, the United States Housing Authority, etc., has done much in the right direction but is merely a beginning. He proposes the real remedy for the ills of our society based on the idea of a coöperative commonwealth.

Individuals must be fired with enthusiasm to create the necessary social changes: "If there are ten men and women in each city who have eyes to see and courage to act, who will be aggressive in their assertion that it is human lives that count, who will actively seek to establish a social order which will encourage the use of nature's bounty and will afford opportunities for all to participate in constructive enterprises," then the United States "may be spared further privation."

This little book has within its pages a lot of good horse sense, an admirable social point of view, but it is mixed with platitudes which having once been stated for the purpose of the record have very little actual function. Moreover, nearly anyone can plan a utopia. The next question is "how to bring it into existence?"

RAY H. ABRAMS

BOOK NOTICES

The Message of The Lord's Prayer, by Igor I. Sikorsky, New York, Scribner, 1942, pp. ix, 68, $1.25.

The author finds in the prayer the "beautiful symmetry of a finished mathematical formula" because "it was obviously intended to be translated into hundreds of different languages," and he claims its words were selected so as to protect their true meaning "against changes resulting from translations and from the effects of time." Moreover, such symmetry would be an aid to memory. Interesting! In the first half of the prayer Mr. Sikorsky places chief emphasis on the petition, "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven," and he seems to believe that Jesus was pointing to the harmony observable in the material universe as an example of the harmony that should prevail among men. Possibly true. In the second half of the prayer, which is with reference to daily bread, forgiveness of our debts, and deliverance from temptation, he runs a close parallel to the story of the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness. From the full-page picture of the author and airplanes on the jacket of the book, one is led to feel that the publishers make much of the fact that Mr. Sikorsky is "one of the world's foremost airplane designers." Perhaps his vocation accounts psychologically for some of the flights which make the book different. It should be read for its interesting treatment of the subject and some helpful comments.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

The Lord's Prayer, by Ernest Freemont Tittle, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, pp. 127, $1.00.

There have been many and valuable critical and historical studies of the Lord's Prayer. There have been others—of decidedly doubtful value—which have sought to examine it from the point of view of the modern world. This modest little volume is and does neither. Rather, it undertakes to look at the present world from the standpoint of this ancient prayer. That is very different. Thus the criticism which rightly falls on attempts of the second sort do not apply here. It does not push any horizons back; it makes no especial contribution to human learning—few books do. Nonetheless it is a distinctly wholesome book, and one I read with appreciation. The problems and perplexities of life today are known to us all; only fools—and they in rapidly diminishing numbers—expect to live in a paradise (at least on this earth) for a long, long while. This able Methodist pastor, whose pen and voice have long been widely known and appreciated, has fairly stated fundamental problems which we all know only too well; and he has done it effectively in the form of eight short chapters—they might well be sermons or addresses—each based on one of the several familiar phrases of this prayer which we never tire of repeating and rarely dream of attempting to practice—perhaps because we think of it as the *Lord's* prayer.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

How Jesus Dealt With Men, by Raymond Calkins, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942, pp. 214, $1.75.

Many of us have long been indebted to Dr. Calkins for his books which have come through the years. As a minister in the Congregational group he has given a good account of his stewardship, and now in retirement continues his larger

ministry. *How Jesus Dealt With Men* grows out of experience and thereby is greatly enriched. The opening chapter, "The Strategy of Jesus," is a setting forth of the author's conviction that Jesus was psychologist, psychiatrist, and psychotherapist long in advance of the rise of these sciences—and he makes a very good case. Ten chapters follow, each dealing with some notable interview of our Lord: Nicodemus, the Woman of Samaria, the Paralytic, etc. If one may venture a criticism of so excellent a book, I would say that there is too much preaching. By the opening chapter one is led to expect a careful study of the insights and methods of interviewing, but really finds ten homilies wherein these insights and methods are incidental. We ministers, even though writing or lecturing, usually succeed in turning out another admirable sermon or book of sermons.

W. R. McNUTT

Maker of Men, by Sherwood Eddy, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. 141, $1.50.

During the first World War Sherwood Eddy wrote, for the soldiers in the war zone, two books, *Maker of Men* and *Suffering and the War.* The present volume is a newly written combination of these earlier books. Jesus is a man of mystery, without those qualities of learning and position that customarily command attention; yet he universally has commanded service from men who find joy and satisfaction in their obedience. He is preëminently the world's maker of men. The meaning of his own growth and influence are revealed in the simple habits of his life, which are also the conditions of character-building today. These were—and are—worship, the reading of the Scriptures, prayer, service, and self-sacrifice. The chapters devoted to these principles of character and influence are effective by their temperate treatment of Jesus and convincing by their examples of men made from the same pattern. Sherwood Eddy adds his positive assertion of a belief in a life after death, personal immortality, with the reasons for such belief. The book closes with the question, "What Shall I Do?" It is the kind of book needed today, when we are coming to put more trust in our simplicities and more dependence upon the recently somewhat neglected spiritual resources.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Missionary Message of the Bible, by Julian Price Love, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. ix, 203, $2.00.

Dr. Love has written a kindly book on a stirring theme. Naturally much of the New Testament directly supports his thesis. Also many sections of the Old Testament are used legitimately to express the same message. Among these latter are the sections which are strongly ethical, those which emphasize a universal note (*e.g.,* Jonah and Ruth), and especially the Servant Songs. The interpretation of such parts of the Old and New Testaments constitutes the body of the book.

Other parts of the Old Testament that have been marshaled to support the missionary idea are not always free from difficulties. Samaria's priest evangelizing the Assyrians, Elijah blessing the widow of Zarephath, Hiram of Tyre having an understanding of the religion of Israel, the Queen of Sheba having an interest in Solomon's God—to use stories such as these to evidence an interest in missions would seem to be overworking the Scriptures in the interest of a theory. Occasionally as in the case of Daniel history is confused, and the author's translation of Gen. 4:1, "I have gotten a man (literally, *the* man) from the Lord," is reminiscent of Job's deceitful brook. Though Dr. Love states that the "first three chapters of

Genesis truly anticipate the whole of our Old and New Testaments in their view of the redemption of humanity" (p. 16), he rarely descends to the crude allegorizing that even today is all too common. The reviewer has the feeling that the above quotation is part of our theological inheritance rather than the deliberate judgment of the author. The major part of the book is on solid ground.

I. G. MATTHEWS

An Introduction to the History of Early New England Methodism: 1789-1839, by George Claude Baker, Jr., Durham, Duke University Press, 1941, pp. 145, $2.50.

This little book, admirable in its sketch of the infiltration of Methodism into the staid and established New England order, is, as the title indicates, a signpost or guide to one who may desire a more comprehensive study of the history of Methodism in this section of America. But it is more. It is a challenge to enter that larger field. It engages the attention and whets the appetite, inviting one to continue the research in the hope of uncovering an even richer vein of human interest stories.

Methodist beginnings in New England are true to the records of the amazing achievements of the early preachers of this denomination in the less settled areas of the new America. There is the same sense of destiny, the command to proclaim the gospel of free grace, the self-confidence and assurance of divine authority which breeds courage, sacrificial endurance, and refusal to countenance evil, but also a spirit of intolerance if not of unfairness toward those of other views and practices.

Strangely enough, the Methodists took little part in the struggle to secure complete separation of church and state in Massachusetts. Or is it strange when one remembers their Anglican parentage?

Since this is an Introduction the author does well in publishing a comprehensive and systematic bibliography, occupying almost half the book, with a list of libraries where the materials may be found.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Contemporary Religious Thought, compiled by Thomas S. Kepler, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941, pp. 423, $3.50.

The varied nature of the material in this volume renders impossible any statement as to its specific content. Instead of commenting upon any of the contributions of the fifty-odd authors, excerpts from whose writings constitute the anthology, I shall try to indicate the aim and general content of the collection.

Professor Kepler's aim is to acquaint the general reader with the drift of religious thought during the second score of years of the twentieth century. He finds, in general, that "the American religious thinker of our era has been more concerned with the philosophy of religion than with theology." By that, he means that the religious thought of the past generation has concerned itself more with why we believe what we do, rather than with what the theologians have told us to believe. Believing this to be a true statement as to what has actually happened, Professor Kepler has endeavored to isolate for us those "definite writings" which "seem to point the way and give direction to religious thought during these [*sc.* the last twenty] years."

The general content of the collection may best be explained by stating the subjects which Kepler considers of primary importance in the field of the philosophy of religion. While he admits that his classification is somewhat arbitrary, he finds

the primary subjects to be the nature of religion, the finding of religious truth, the idea of God, the problem of evil, the meaning of worship, and immortality. Ten selections from different authors are gathered together under each one of these heads, the endeavor being to state from the sources the best thought of the past score of years in each of these phases of intellectual endeavor and religious discipline.

A list of the authors cited in this anthology may intrigue you into reading the volume. They are, among others, Fosdick, Wieman, Edwards, Holt, Aubrey, Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, Dewey, Tillich, Durant, Lippmann, Otto, Barth, Haydon, Mather, Tittle, Coffin, Brunner, Jones, Brightman, Underhill, Calhoun, and Compton.

The book loses considerably in value for the research student because of its lack of a subject index. For the deepening of general religious culture however, the volume is admirable.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Prefaces to Inquiry, by William Richard Gondin, New York, King's Crown Press, 1941, pp. x, 220, $2.00.

A study in the origins and relevance of modern theories of knowledge, this volume defends inquiries into how we know. It does not regard such endeavors as "a fussing with irrelevancies" as so many critics have contended. The author is rather of the opinion that they are "a means of deepening our appreciation of the intellectual life on all its levels, from the puzzled querying of the child as to the simple *what's* and *why's* of household gadgets and neighborhood commonplaces to the same sublime impertinence of scientist and philosopher throughout all the realm which sustains their questioning" (pp. 193 f.).

Mr. Gondin thinks of epistemology as concerned not with the facts of knowledge, but with the fact of knowledge itself. When, therefore, a preface to inquiry is offered to the race, it constitutes a raising of the question as to *what man is about* when he is busy at his usual tasks. Plato produced such a work in the *Theætetus.* Many of the basic speculative texts of the middle ages showed a similar concern. Modern philosophy, from its inauguration with Descartes, has been "epistemological to the core." And not a few of the writings of the present day witness to "a period of vigorous renaissance of epistemological interest."

The main drift of the book consists of an elucidation of the early theories of knowledge found in the writings of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Kant. Having presented these, mention is made of the reaction against such theories in the writings of Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, E. G. Spaulding, and A. N. Whitehead. But having stated that reaction, Mr. Gondin goes on to illuminate a more recent return to the problem of knowledge and its fundamental importance as recorded in writings by P. W. Bridgman, Sir Arthur Eddington, Stuart Chase, C. K. Ogden, and I. A. Richards. Prefaces to inquiry, he concludes, are not out of date, but are today being projected into the forefront of earnest, rational consideration.

This work is recommended as an introductory study to those who are interested in understanding the history and the various theories of epistemological research.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Let's Talk It Over! by Leonard P. Aries, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. ix, 85, $1.00.

You may think you know the answer. You may not be conscious of being a

slave to a bias or a prejudice. Well, one way of finding out that others may have a segment of the truth thus far denied to you, or that the problem is much more complex than you had ever imagined, or that what you are so certain about is the product of a prejudice which has escaped your notice because it has been so "handy," is to take part in a real honest-to-goodness discussion group. The reviewer has seen this method of learning work wonders times without number.

This small book is a statement of case studies in high school groups dealing with vital themes such as "What Is an American?" "Propaganda and Its Analysis," "Refugees," "Prejudice and Understanding," and "What Can We Do in a World of Crisis?" Indirectly it is an appeal for shared thinking as one of the best methods of educating for life in a democracy. What *"Let's talk* it over" suggests is the antithesis of the methods used by totalitarian governments.

The discussion group method need not be a pooling of ignorance, nor thinking on a low common denominator level. Granted a leader of competence, it has great possibilities as a stimulus and corrective of individual thinking, and always moves in the direction of a proper "sense of the meeting."

Classes within the church school, young people's groups, and forums would profit by its use. Try it out on your midweek prayer service!

FREDERICK B. IGLER

Christmas Traditions, by William Muir Auld, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. 179, $1.90.

This is not a new book; published first in 1931, it has gone through seven printings. That fact attests its worth: as a volume it is the result of sound research, is written charmingly, and is an answer to all one's questions about the origin, growth, and meaning of the many Christmas traditions.

The opening chapter considers the likely year of our Lord's birth, why and how December 25th came to be selected as the traditional day of his birth, why there was little or no interest in his nativity for the first three centuries, and how finally in the fourth century the Christmas festival got under way. Christmas came singing: two chapters consider the origin and development of the carol. In turn a chapter is devoted to Christmas colors (evergreen, holly, mistletoe, and rosemary); the yule log and the many lighting ceremonies; the Christmas tree (the thorn, the artificial tree, and finally the evergreen common with us); Christmas delights, such as the spirit of generosity—benefactions to children in particular—St. Nicholas, Kriss Kringle, Santa Claus, and the Christmas stocking; and a final and lovely chapter on Christmas bells.

It is a delight to commend such a book to readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY.

W. R. McNUTT

The French Laic Laws, 1879-1889, by Evelyn M. Acomb, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 282, $3.50.

American students in general lack intimate knowledge of Christian history in France. The story of the failure of the Protestant Reformation in that land, the terrible Religious Wars, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew is familiar. But of succeeding courses too little is known.

Dr. Acomb has performed a difficult task and has rendered a valuable contribution to an understanding of this phase of French history. France has never been happy under the domination of Rome. Her early independent nationalism and the Babylonish Captivity are sufficient evidences. Yet she never developed internal,

spiritual passion and strength to achieve her own religious freedom. The result was a secularization rather than a reformation of conditions and institutions.

With fine insight and excellent interpretive ability the author presents her documented data. Unbiased and unprejudiced she lays before the reader the anti-clerical movement, revealing that inner discord and party antagonism that has made France a prey to her united and totalitarian enemy of the centuries.

The weak and wavering Vichy of today may be more easily understood by a study of this informing and enlightening history of a decade in French national life.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Vauxhall Gardens, by James Granville Southworth, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xi, 199, $2.75.

The history of the Royal Gardens, Vauxhall (first so-called in 1822 with the approval of George IV) is one of the chapters in the social history of England, covering the period from the middle of the seventeenth century to the year 1859 when they were finally closed. Originally only a great house and its gardens, Vauxhall, located in the parish of Lambeth almost directly opposite the Surrey end of the present Vauxhall Bridge, became a centre of entertainment. And what entertainment! Concerts, fireworks, spectacles, lights, ingenious and clever devices, statues, and gardens crowded for the attention of royal guests and the masses—at shillings and even guineas per admission. This "world's fair" of earlier times yields its secrets to Mr. Southworth in his detailed and painstaking story of their history, programs, celebrities, social manners, and morals. The chapter titles indicate the scope of the work: Introduction and History of the Gardens, Owners and Operators, Approach to the Gardens, The Gardens, Entertainments, Vauxhall Manners, Some Singers and Composers, and Dissolution. While Southworth's story is interesting and historical and becomes a living and realistic account of an age that is past, the modern reader feels somewhat as did "Boz." Charles Dickens' *alter ego,* it may be remembered, visited the Gardens by daylight and found them disappointingly drab. His disillusionment is reflected in the failure of a twentieth-century reader to be overly enthusiastic about the pleasures of the Vauxhall Gardens.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Poems for Life, compiled by Thomas Curtis Clark, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. ix, 370, $2.50.

The best description of this volume is found in its subtitle, "Quotable Verse from the Seers and Singers of Yesterday and Today." Those who are familiar with Clark's earlier anthologies will easily know the type of verse in this collection, for this is a companion volume to *Quotable Poems.* The selected verses are alive and will find themselves quoted time upon time from many pulpits. For this purpose the book is of worth; but if one wishes to read poetry for the enjoyment and excellence of the poems themselves, there are many finer anthologies. An index of first lines would make the book more serviceable.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

The Atonement, by Loraine Boettner, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1941, pp. 136, $1.00.

This brief work is an endeavor to present a statement of the orthodox doctrine of the substitutionary or satisfaction theory of the atonement. It says nothing new but simply repeats what has been stated before times without number.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

BOOKS RECEIVED

**War as a Social Institution,* edited by Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xvii, 333, $3.50.

**Christian Crisis,* by Michael de la Bodeyere, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. xiii, 210, $1.75.

Keeping the Faith, by W. E. Schuette, Columbus, Wartburg Press, 1942, pp. 227, $2.00.

Thirty-one occasional sermons by the president of the eastern district of the American Lutheran Church.

Sources of the Quaker Peace Testimony, by Howard H. Brinton, Wallingford (Penna.), Pendle Hill, n. d., pp. 46, $0.25.

**The Catholic Revival in England,* by John J. O'Connor, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. ix, 102, $1.00.

**Medieval Humanism,* by Gerald G. Walsh, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. ix, 103, $1.00.

**The Christian Faith,* by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, 1942, pp. xv, 216, $2.00.

**The Time Stream,* by Edgar Laing Heermance, Burlington (Vt.), Free Press Assoc., 1942, pp. 205, $2.00.

**No Sign Shall Be Given,* by Hugh S. Tigner, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. 198, $1.75.

**The Lambeth Conferences,* by William Richmond Curtis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 355, $4.00.

**Getting Down to Cases,* by Charles T. Holman, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. 207, $2.00.

**The Highway of God,* by Ralph W. Sockman, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. xiv, 228, $2.00.

**Jesus in Action,* by Benjamin W. Robinson, New York, Macmillan, 1942 pp. vii, 217, $1.50.

**The Fine Art of Living Together,* by Albert W. Beaven, New York, Harper, 1942 (revised edition), pp. xxi, 134, $1.60.

Christ Triumphant, by W. M. Seay, Nashville, Broadman, 1942, pp. 154, $1.00.

Eighteen sermons by the pastor of the Baptist Church of Beaufort (S. C.).

* To be reviewed.